364 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
appreciated his potential and, as consolation, nominated him as Am-
bassador to the United Nations in 1971.
In 1973 he became Chairman of the Republican National Com-
mittee. A sequence of stellar postings followed. President Ford made
him envoy to the People’s Republic of China: this was an ambassador-
ship in all but name at a time when America formally preferred to
base its Chinese diplomatic relations in Taiwan. His competence in
handling complex matters of high politics induced Ford in 1976 to
bring him back to America as CIA Director. He put himself up for
adoption as Republican candidate in the 1980 presidential election,
but settled for becoming Reagan’s running mate. He was chosen as
someone who was known as a ‘centrist’ in the party and would bring
balance to its campaign. When appearing in public, he was often dour
and inexpressive. As such he appeared a useful electoral counterpart to
the charismatic Reagan. He served two vice-presidential terms, sat in
the National Security Council and talked frequently to Gorbachëv and
Shevardnadze.
Bush acknowledged that, in contrast to his predecessor, he would
not be offering ‘the vision thing’ to the American public. He made a
virtue of being cautious and pragmatic, and had written to Gorbachëv
to confirm his desire for a pause while the new administration reflected
on foreign policy.^3 He gave the letter to Henry Kissinger to deliver
while in Moscow with Giscard d’Estaing and Yasuhiro Nakasone,
among others, as part of a delegation of the Trilateral Commission – a
body founded in 1973 by businessman and philanthropist David
Rockefeller as a forum for retired public figures to report on problems
of world politics. (Bush had wanted to demonstrate to the Soviet lead-
ers that he had not forgotten about them, but this was hardly a brilliant
move. The new President was to confide to Gorbachëv a few days later
that he would ask Scowcroft to assess Kissinger’s report but would not
necessarily believe everything he said ‘because this was, after all, Henry
Kissinger’.)^4 Outgoing Secretary of State Shultz had been hoping for
more action. On 8 January he and his wife took their leave of the
Shevardnadzes. The two couples were on amicable terms and O’Bie
came along despite her frail health.^5 Shultz confided that he personally
favoured an easing of the trade restrictions as a reward for the USSR’s
promise to withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan.^6
Bush had no clear political line. By using Kissinger as an emissary
while indicating that he had no serious confidence in him, he was
giving a mixed signal to the Kremlin. At the same time he asked