THE FIFTH MAN 365Gorbachëv to wait until he established whether continuity in policy
was truly in the national interest. Shultz with typical thoroughness had
devised a series of briefings to enable a smooth transition between
administrations; but Bush declined even to give him a call.^7 He also
weakened the ties with Thatcher. The French and West Germans cele-
brated the ending of Britain’s privileged entrée to the White House.
Mitterrand commented that, whereas she spoke forcefully to her
European partners, she had behaved like an eight-year-old girl when
talking to Reagan. (Mitterrand had forgotten about Thatcher’s bruising
conversations with Reagan after the Reykjavik summit.) Bush was not
going to fall for her charms.^8 He had always shown an analytical cast
of mind. Whereas Reagan had learned to forget about his lifetime’s
suspicion of the Soviet leadership, Bush wanted to prevent the onset of
national amnesia. He aimed to feel totally sure that Gorbachëv had not
fooled his predecessor as President.
Scowcroft was on record as advocating the prudence of holding on
to a variety of nuclear weapons. He never shared Reagan’s objective of
total denuclearization.^9 He had publicly criticized the Intermedi-
ate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty draft – and Bush had been lukewarm
about it when he was Vice President. They now had the freedom to ask
whether it was prudent to resume the line that Reagan and Shultz had
marked out. On 9 February Bush declared to a joint session of Con-
gress: ‘Prudence and common sense dictate that we try to understand
the full meaning of the change going on there, review our policies, and
then proceed with caution. But I’ve personally assured General Secre-
tary Gorbachev that at the conclusion of such a review we will be
ready to move forward.’^10
Not everybody in the NATO leadership was happy about the
American slowdown. West European governments had never felt
comfortable with Reagan’s diplomacy, especially after Reykjavik; but
they did at least appreciate that, in his own mind, he was trawling for
a catch that would benefit the entire world. Bush seemed to be content
to sail across a barren sea without purpose or destination. His per-
formance was dispiriting to Western powers, who wanted a proper
captain in the White House wheelhouse.
Genscher felt this very keenly. Still excited about Gorbachëv’s
United Nations speech, the West German Foreign Minister yearned
for Washington to reciprocate. When this failed to occur, Genscher
buttonholed Shevardnadze and insisted that the Soviet leadership
instead should seize the initiative. Gorbachëv had promised to cut the