368 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Baklanov and Ivan Belousov, working with data from the KGB and the
International Labour Organization, analysed what advantages might
result from an ending of the arms race. They predicted that the Inter-
mediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty could save $8 billion for the
American budget even though it would cost $2.5 billion to destroy
stockpiles and carry out inspections. They predicted a net gain of
8.2 billion rubles from the parallel process in the USSR, and this did
not even include the savings that would accrue from the rundown of
strategic offensive weapons.^31 They suggested that the West’s big cor-
porations would suffer from the diminution of governmental contracts
for military research and output. There would also be mass unemploy-
ment. They forecast that the USSR would avoid any such outcome for
the basic reason that its economy, as they mildly put it, did not have
‘an oversaturation of the market’ in consumer goods. This was Marxist
jargon for something that had bothered Soviet leaders for decades. The
deficits in civilian output were a chronic problem. Baklanov and Bel-
ousov prophesied a bright future for the country’s industrial capacity.^32
The sooner there was a comprehensive arms agreement, the easier
it would be for the USSR to realize the benefit for Soviet people. This
in turn would boost the appeal of perestroika. Gorbachëv badly needed
Bush to confirm that he would stick to the line that Reagan had
marked out. One positive trend, from the USSR’s standpoint, was the
President’s disinclination to give priority to the Strategic Defense Ini-
tiative. Lieutenant General Abrahamson saw the way that the wind
was blowing and resigned his post. On 9 February 1989 he delivered
his ‘end of tour’ report, convinced as ever that some of the basic
research – he picked out the so-called Brilliant Pebbles project as an
example – could be completed and ready for deployment by 1994.^33
But the reality was that the American Congress wanted to reduce
funding for the programme. Bush sympathized with this desire even
though he left it to people to work this out for themselves – he did not
dare imply criticism of his popular predecessor.
The other signals from Washington steadily depressed Gorbachëv’s
hopes. The nadir was plumbed on 3 March when Bush ordered
the CIA to carry out a comprehensive review of American policy on
the USSR. He had seen every important paper that reached Reagan’s
desk. Yet now he dithered. He gave neither approval nor disapproval of
the foreign policy of his predecessor – the only point of distinction
lay in his omission of the Strategic Defense Initiative from the terms
of reference of the proposed review.^34 Bush instructed officials under