THE FIFTH MAN 369the CIA’s Fritz Ermath to examine the following question: ‘How can
we make [inter-continental ballistic missiles] survivable?’^35 This was
hardly a question that encouraged a constructive approach to Gor-
bachëv and Shevardnadze, and Ermath had anyway always been
sceptical about the Kremlin’s intentions. When Bush said that he
wanted the review to be as thorough as possible, he was not just in -
dicating his reluctance to be hasty. He also seemed open to the idea of
changing the entire direction of American foreign policy.
Shevardnadze encountered the new attitude when meeting Baker
on 7 March at the Conventional Forces in Europe talks in Vienna.
Baker demanded freedom for all the peoples of Europe and called on
Soviet leaders to undertake an explicit rejection of the Brezhnev
Doctrine. He slated the USSR’s lack of respect for human rights. He
deprecated its military supplies to Nicaragua. He objected to what
he saw as Shevardnadze’s efforts to cosy up to Iran’s Islamist leadership
by visiting Ayatollah Khomeini. Shevardnadze replied as best he could
that the priority for America and the USSR ought to be to resume
their collaboration on nuclear arms reduction. Baker was implacable,
explaining that the Americans had begun their policy review and
could not say how long it would take. Shevardnadze warned: ‘If you
begin to modernize your tactical missiles, we’ll be obliged to react.’ He
pushed for arms talks to recommence after Baker’s scheduled trip to
Moscow in April. This only made Baker more annoyed. The Bush
administration, he insisted, would return to the talks only when it felt
properly ready.^36 What made things worse for Shevardnadze was that
the West Europeans were no more encouraging in Vienna. Scepticism
was growing among their leaders about ‘what was happening in the
Soviet Union’. There were even doubts about whether Gorbachëv’s
perestroika could last much longer.^37
As he flew back from Austria, Shevardnadze took stock. Baker at
one point had at least promised to build on the foundations left
behind by Shultz; he had also affirmed that the entire administration
wished perestroika to be a success. But the trip had been a dispiriting
experience: ‘Baker is harsher.’^38 Earlier, Shevardnadze had overheard
Howe saying: ‘Shevardnadze isn’t a Gromyko.’ Shevardnadze had inter-
jected: ‘Well, and Baker’s no Shultz.’^39 He kept his thoughts to himself
when reporters were present. Any mention of the frost between
America and the USSR could have unwelcome consequences.^40 There
was anyway little that he or Gorbachëv could do about the situation
until the American ‘pause’ finished. US Congressman George Brown