THE FIFTH MAN 371becoming ungovernable. Shevardnadze was the only Politburo member
who had the knowledge and experience to calm the situation. He hap-
pened to have been en route to Berlin as matters came to their fatal
climax; as he admitted to an aide, he had tried for some time to avoid
being identified with decisions unpopular with the Georgian people.^43
The Tbilisi massacre came as a terrible shock. He immediately changed
his plans and hastened to Georgia, where he cleared the armed forces
from the city and restored a degree of calm.^44 He concluded that he
had been wrong to steer clear of ‘the national question’ since coming
to work in the ministry in Moscow.^45
Soviet leaders saw the need to show greater frankness about their
problems in talks with foreign leaders. Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze
were known as open in their negotiating style. Now other Politburo
members began to talk with some frankness. The stereotype of the
unforthcoming Kremlin politician was being eroded.
On 18 April Prime Minister Ryzhkov met other European heads of
government in Luxemburg.^46 Thatcher spoke warmly about Gor-
bachëv’s reforms but urged Ryzhkov to focus on the demands of
consumers.^47 Ryzhkov himself wanted to increase trade between Com-
econ and the European Economic Community. He acknowledged the
USSR’s deficits in meat and grain at a time when the armed forces
continued to gobble up excessive resources. The budget was unsustain-
able. Ryzhkov said he was aiming to carry out a basic ‘price reform’
even though people would be furious about paying more for every-
thing in the state stores.^48 Kohl asked him about the prospects of
agrarian reform. Ryzhkov was candid about the plight of the country-
side and proposed economic cooperation with West Germany as a way
of alleviating the problems.^49 Reporting on the earthquake in Arme-
nia, he compared it to four or five nuclear bombs being dropped on an
area the size of Luxemburg.^50 Ryzhkov only showed any poise when
discussing the Austrian desire to join the European Economic Com-
munity. The USSR, as one of the Big Three in 1945, could still put
obstacles in Austria’s path. But Ryzhkov said that the Soviet leadership
had no objection so long as the Austrians did not join NATO. The sole
request he made in return was for the West European leaders to nudge
the Americans towards reviving the arms talks.^51
The Washington policy review was still no nearer to delivery.
Really there was no need for fresh research on matters that had
occupied Ermath and his CIA colleagues for years. In fact they
had finished their first draft by mid-March. Their main conclusion –