THE FIFTH MAN 373The truth was obvious. The USSR had been caught in breach of its
obligations, and the potential for international embarrassment was
boundless. Such was the matter’s sensitivity that the Big Five recom-
mended that the Politburo should meet in a ‘closed session’ to settle
the matter.^61
Gorbachëv’s preference was to hold on to the biological weapons
but to convert them, somehow or other, to defensive purposes. A
Central Committee decree was signed on 2 October 1989. It was three
years since the authorities had decided on a ‘liquidation’ of the stocks
at its various facilities – a party decree of 19 November 1986 had
started the ball rolling and a similar decree confirmed the move eleven
months later by ordering preparations for international inspections of
facilities for the production of biological weapons.^62 The more recent
intervention by the British and Americans shook up the pace. Gor-
bachëv had to decide where he stood on the matter.
Baker went to Moscow and talked to Gorbachëv and others on 11
May 1989. After decrying the Soviet lack of cooperation over Central
America, he emphasized that the American administration wished
perestroika well. He admitted that not every American official was opti-
mistic. Baker called for a constructive relationship. He also tried to get
Gorbachëv to hasten the reform of retail prices, saying it was wise to
proceed quickly while the economic difficulties could still be blamed
on the political leaders in power before 1985. There was a desultory
exchange of opinions on the progress of nuclear arms reduction. As
officials on both sides entered the deliberations, Akhromeev demanded
respect for the principle of reciprocity. Shevardnadze, with Gorbachëv’s
endorsement, highlighted the Soviet leadership’s difficulties now that it
faced criticism by military commanders for conceding to the Ameri-
cans on the SS-23 question. Baker sensed the need to provide a general
statement of American intentions and announced that ‘a minimal
number of nuclear devices is absolutely necessary for our strategy of
flexible response which assures the preservation of peace in Europe’. He
announced the intention to modernize the Lance nuclear missile.^63
The American administration reasoned that the Lances were
allowed by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. His argu-
ments failed to enthuse Gorbachëv, who had shown goodwill by
getting rid of the Soviet SS-23s in order to get agreement with Reagan.
Bush and Baker were breaking with the spirit of compromise. Gor-
bachëv gloomily commented that cooperation was a two-way street.^64
It was in this atmosphere that the review of American foreign