374 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
policy in its final variant arrived on Bush’s desk on 13 May. Divisions
about the future of Soviet ‘strategic behavior’ persisted. The only point
of agreement was about the need for a cautious approach while the
USSR remained ‘the principal adversary of the United States and its
allies through the 1990s’. America would nevertheless find opportuni-
ties to change its policy if the USSR genuinely stayed on the path of
demilitarization. The American administration needed to be flexible
but vigilant. Ermath had ceased to give unidirectional advice. The
review presented the choice starkly before the President, and he alone
could make it. He could either lessen the degree of insecurity in world
politics or else decrease the military component of the budget. The
first option would involve prolonged competition with the Soviet lead-
ership; the second would take Gorbachëv at face value and run down
expenditure on the armed forces. Ermath described the arguments
as finely poised.^65 The review recommended the modernization of
America’s strategic offensive forces; but it also advised a decrease in
the national ‘defense efforts’ and underlined the fact that the USSR
had ‘significant disadvantages’ in military technology.^66
At long last Bush accepted that he would have to make up his own
mind. No one could be President but the President. For four months
he had havered. On 29 May he called an end to his ‘pause’ and sent
Gorbachëv a letter on arms reduction. He put forward a proposed
schedule for cutting back conventional forces in Europe. He men-
tioned that he was about to explain his ideas to the North Atlantic
Council on the same day.^67
This was not yet a commitment to serious negotiations across the
entire spectrum. On 13 June, while on a trip to London, Reagan broke
his silence and encouraged a renewal of the momentum: ‘I believe
Mikhail Gorbachëv is the Soviets’ best hope to turn things round. It is
true that the West could stand pat while this is happening. We are not
the ones who must change. It is not our people who’re isolated from
the information that allows them to be creative and productive. But it
is exactly when you are strong and comfortable that you should take
risks.’^68 Gorbachëv, visiting Paris, lamented to Mitterrand that the
American President lacked any ‘original thinking altogether’ and that
Baker lacked imagination.^69 As it happened, Bush was coming round
to understanding the need for action. In July he wrote again to Gor-
bachëv proposing that they should hold their first summit. He offered
Camp David as the venue, perhaps in September. He suggested that
Gorbachëv might use the trip to give a second big speech to the