THE FIFTH MAN 375United Nations General Assembly. Bush suggested that, for the talks
between them, they should meet on an informal basis, ‘with neckties
off ’ and without a large team of associates.^70
Gorbachëv welcomed the overture but held out for a different
geographical location. He baulked at Camp David or elsewhere in
America.^71 Without much trouble the two sides agreed on Malta. Or
rather they agreed to anchor in the Mediterranean off the Maltese
coast in two ships, one Soviet and the other American. It would be the
first marine summit between the superpowers.
One of the problems for Gorbachëv was that the American ‘pause’
had encouraged the grumblers in Moscow. He was alert to the danger.
On 28 May 1989 he rebuked Karpov at a Central Committee plenum
for denigrating the high command. He was proud of having succeeded
in getting the General Staff to accept a drastic decrease in the number
of generals, and tact was essential while the politicians applied pres-
sure upon the armed forces.^72 The military-industrial lobby was
becoming more difficult to placate. On 6 June Belyakov wrote to
Baklanov that Bush was hoping to push the Soviet leadership into a
corner. How, asked Belyakov, could it be realistic for the USSR to agree
to destroy 40,000 tanks within the next two years? He feared that the
Politburo would give way just because it had a fear of adverse interna-
tional propaganda. He had the same presentiment about Bush’s
proposal for a drastic reduction in the number of military aircraft.
Belyakov was not completely intransigent. He was willing for Soviet
forces in Eastern Europe to drop to 275,000 men.^73 But he wanted
Gorbachëv to stand his ground more firmly. Four years of indulgence
were ending. Gorbachëv had reason to worry as he began to face fun-
damental opposition to his foreign and security policy.
Baker wanted to freshen the atmosphere and in July invited
Shevardnadze to pay a trip to Wyoming, where he had recently bought
a ranch, for one-on-one talks in a relaxed atmosphere. As they got
down to business, Shevardnadze complained about the way that things
were going in Afghanistan. Baker as usual indicated that progress
would depend on Najibullah’s departure; he denied that America
wanted to see an Islamist fundamentalist government in power in
Kabul.^74 At the same time he insisted: ‘I want to repeat that we are
strongly committed to the success of perestroika, recognizing that this
very much depends on what you do and how you respond to the
challenges you face.’^75