376 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Shevardnadze flew to Washington to explore the possibilities of
new agreements with Bush and Baker on 21 September. Bush insisted
that nobody in Washington wanted ‘your reform’ to fail; he denied
trying to cause complications in the USSR.^76 He added: ‘We have no
interest in a Kabul regime that is hostile to the Soviet Union.’^77 He
expressed pleasure about the USSR’s refusal to interfere in Eastern
Europe, and added: ‘We think the Soviet leadership has handled the
Polish situation admirably.’^78 He claimed, inaccurately, that more Poles
lived in Chicago than in Poland; he commented that they shared his
pleasure in Poland’s recent political settlement. On Latin America,
Baker recognized that the Kremlin was no longer supplying Nicaragua
with arms. For once, the two sides skipped over the problems posed by
Cuba.^79 Baker and Shevardnadze met next day to prepare an agenda
for the next summit. They planned how to resolve questions about
nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons as well as about regional
hotspots such as Cambodia, Vietnam and Israel. In a flush of bon-
homie, Shevardnadze suggested a joint US–USSR mission to Kabul to
settle current problems. Baker brought him down to earth by handing
over a list of people still being refused exit visas from the USSR.
Shevardnadze had brought along his own list of alleged political pris-
oners in US prisons.^80
He and Baker knew that he was holding few big cards in his hand.
He had brought the leading Soviet economist Nikolai Shmelëv with
him; and Shmelëv, ignoring protocol, predicted a Soviet economic
catastrophe. Baker replied that the CIA was nowhere near as pessi-
mistic in its projections.^81 But he did know that the USSR was in more
urgent need of treaties than America was. He spelled out the Ameri-
can terms. Shevardnadze had to understand that the chances of
repealing the Jackson–Vanik amendment, which restricted trade with
the Soviet Union, intimately depended on how well the Kremlin dealt
with abuses of human rights.^82
Baker accompanied him to Wyoming, where, in the peace of the
countryside, they had informal conversations. Shevardnadze admitted
that the Soviet leadership had badly underestimated the dangers of the
‘national question’ in the early years of perestroika. This frankness
attracted Baker, who replied with equal openness. Baker repeated that
American support for the independence movement in the Baltic
region of the USSR was sincere and permanent – he asked Shevard-
nadze to recognize the public demands being made upon Bush:
‘I don’t raise this to pressure you or to hector you.’ Shevardnadze