The End of the Cold War. 1985-1991

(Sean Pound) #1
THE FIFTH MAN 377

answered that the Soviet leadership was averse to the use of force. He
called for the disbandment of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: ‘Let’s
release your allies and ours. While NATO exists, the Warsaw Pact also
exists.’ Baker suggested that it was high time for East Germany to
undertake its own perestroika. Shevardnadze stuck firmly to the idea
that this was the business of the East Germans alone; but then he
spoke with total candour: ‘If I were in their shoes, I’d let everyone go,
leave. Of course, it is true that if as many as one million people leave,
that would be a serious problem for Eastern Europe, but I would let
them go.’^83 There had never been an exchange like it between a Secre-
tary of State and a Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister. From that moment
onwards, Baker felt certain that Shevardnadze was a man he could
deal with.
Though the President and Secretary of State had made up their
minds in Gorbachëv’s favour, others in the administration remained
sceptical. Lawrence Eagleburger, Baker’s Deputy Secretary, caused an
upset in October by talking about how Soviet policies might give rise
to instability in Europe. Democratic Party leaders expressed horror at
what they interpreted as a State Department preference for continued
confrontation. Baker stepped in smartly to reaffirm the official line
and to contend that, regardless of whether Gorbachëv’s could achieve
his objectives, perestroika held out the promise of aiding American
interests. The priority, he maintained, should be to lock the USSR into
treaties on arms reduction and other such matters. Baker at the same
time barred Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates from
addressing the National Collegiate Security College about Gorbachëv’s
current difficulties. In a speech in San Francisco, he made a call for
optimism: ‘If the Soviets have already destroyed weapons, it will be
difficult, costly and time-consuming for any future Kremlin leadership
to reverse the process and to assert military priority.’^84 From a pause to
a leap, Bush and Baker found themselves on the path that Reagan and
Shultz had laid out.

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