380 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
condition, the Japanese would look favourably upon Soviet overtures
for economic assistance. To Shevardnadze, this sounded too much like
an ultimatum. But he refrained from discounting the possibility of
giving up the South Kuriles and was pleased that Soviet leaders could
again talk to the Japanese.^11
As Gorbachëv had guessed, the Americans felt some concern
about the USSR’s moves in Asia, and Bush quickly organized a presi-
dential visit to China. This contrasted with his drawn-out indecision
about the Soviet Union. Bush knew his own mind about the Chinese
question and resolved to pre-empt Gorbachëv’s overture to Beijing.
His three-day visit started on 23 February. The Americans put on a
show of military power. USS Blue Ridge, the command ship of the
Seventh Fleet, arrived at Shanghai – and the agreement was for it to
stay at anchor throughout the presidential trip.^12
Gorbachëv knew that the Chinese would be tough negotiators.
When Prime Minister Li Peng attended Chernenko’s funeral, he had
spurned Gorbachëv’s attempt at graciousness and warned that China
would never accept subordinate status to the USSR; but he did not rule
out a thaw in contacts.^13 He returned to Moscow in June 1985 to sign
a pact on economic and technological cooperation – at that time the
Chinese remained interested in acquiring Soviet help in modernizing
China’s industrial sector. When Li visited the USSR again that Decem-
ber, Gorbachëv made a pitch for the normalization of relations. He
said that the two countries shared an interest in opposing the Strategic
Defense Initiative. He queried the rationale for Chinese support of
America’s Afghan policy; he disowned any desire by the USSR to use
Vietnam as a way of causing trouble for China.^14 Li simply repeated
that China wanted to guard its independence and avoid the role of
‘little brother’ to the Soviet Union. He told Gorbachëv that there could
be no normalization until the Kremlin altered its policies towards
Afghanistan and Cambodia – Li sharply objected to Moscow’s en-
dorsement of the Vietnamese military presence on Cambodian terri-
tory.^15
If Soviet leaders wanted a rapprochement with China, they had to
give way on this. Shevardnadze and his ministry well understood that
the Chinese objected to Vietnam’s status as a client state of the USSR.
The Kremlin had supported the North Vietnamese in their war against
the Americans through to 1975, and this assistance had continued
after Vietnam’s reunification. Shevardnadze could see that Moscow
would eventually have to choose between Vietnam and China.^16 The