384 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
USSR wanted amicable links with every Asian country. Saddam took
the news stoically. He said he understood why Gorbachëv might want
to resolve his differences with the Iranian government even though he
detested what the Ayatollah Khomeini stood for. The Iraqi dictator
made a joke of it all: ‘May Allah help you. Only let it be our Allah and
not the Iranian one!’^33
On to Iran, where Shevardnadze hoped to mend fences. But if
Deng and Assad had been bad-tempered hosts, Khomeini was even
more difficult in his own peculiar way. The Ayatollah refused to see
him in Tehran. Shevardnadze had to fly down to Qom, where Kho-
meini received him in his modest little house: power had not made
him materialistic. It was the strangest of diplomatic encounters since
the old man proved interested only in questions of spiritual belief and
practice. He would talk about nothing else. To Shevardnadze he gave
the impression of an impoverished widower. Khomeini rejected every
attempt at dialogue about foreign policy despite knowing that this was
the sole purpose of Shevardnadze’s trip. There was no exchange of
practical options, and Khomeini gave no sign even about whether he
wanted better relations with Moscow.^34 The USSR was no nearer to
achieving a process of conciliation. It was a futile trip, except insofar as
the Politburo acquired a better idea about what it was dealing with on
its southern frontier; and at least the Americans were made aware that
the Soviet leadership remained capable of at least trying to establish
relations independently of them. Indeed, when Gorbachëv heard
Shevardnadze’s report, he gave thought to how the USSR might sell
arms to Tehran.^35
Shevardnadze’s Asian tour prepared the ground for Gorbachëv’s
own trip to China. He was scheduled to arrive on 15 May. American
nerves were on edge at the project, and the Beijing embassy advised
the State Department to remind the world that ‘Sino-American re -
lations generally continue on the upswing in political, military and
economic areas’.^36 The State Department worried that China might
exploit a rapprochement with the USSR so as to induce America to
moderate its policy on Taiwan. The Americans noted the growth of
political demonstrations led by Chinese students. They sympathized
with the democratic demands of the protesters, but were wary of being
seen to interfere. The State Department gave advice to voice a ‘prefer-
ence for dialogue’.^37
The Chinese agreed to receive Gorbachëv on condition that he
caused no trouble for them. They had seen how crowds gathered