THE OTHER CONTINENT: ASIA 387‘democratism’. He admitted that the process had led to unforeseen
complications. He ridiculed those Western commentators who hoped
that the reforms in China and the USSR would lead to the restoration
of capitalism; he insisted that the path of economic and political
democracy would in fact strengthen the foundations of socialism. He
explained his ideas to bring settlement to Asian trouble spots.^49
Shevardnadze held talks on the same day with Jiang Zemin, Polit-
buro member and Shanghai party leader, who said that the Chinese
aspired to the role of intermediaries in the conflicts of south Asia. He
added that the Nepalese wanted the USSR to help them to improve
relations with India; and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had
asked for the Soviet authorities to regularize the situation in Afghani-
stan. Shevardnadze exclaimed that Bhutto herself ought to start to act
with the same objective in mind.^50 Nevertheless the Chinese desire to
mediate was something new. This pleased Shevardnadze, who con-
cluded: ‘In fact the normalization of relations with China is an historic
event.’^51
The trip was different from any that Gorbachëv made. When he
visited foreign countries, be they capitalist or communist, he exercised
fascination for their politicians. China’s supreme elite was uniquely
aloof. The USSR was patently not a priority for Deng and Li, and they
certainly felt they had nothing to learn from Moscow. Deng did not
offer China as a model for any other state in the world. He was trans-
forming his own country and had only its needs in mind when talking
to foreigners. Gorbachëv had received a signal about this when the
Soviet visitors were taken on a tour of Shanghai factories and shown
the production of Nike trainers, some Teflon kitchenware and various
up-to-date toys and medicines.^52 If the Chinese could modernize and
expand their economy by attracting Western capitalist corporations
into their country, they would hardly want to saddle themselves with a
close relationship with the USSR’s ailing manufacturing sector. While
the CoCom restrictions stayed in place, moreover, there remained
little chance that the USSR would make its own burst forward towards
industrial renovation. The same facts pointed to why Gorbachëv
would have found it difficult to imitate communist China. Without
foreign direct investment, Deng could never have made his great eco-
nomic leap since the mid-1970s. CoCom precluded that option for
Gorbachëv, and he would probably have discounted such a route even
if it had been open to him.
But the evidence of the trip failed to cure Gorbachëv of his