388 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
blindness about China’s economic achievements. Having seen inside
those thriving industrial enterprises, he acted as if they were an indus-
trial sham put on for gullible foreigners. He would never change his
mind while he was in power. When talking to James Baker later in
May 1989, he assured him Chinese technical and scientific capacity
was hitting the buffers.^53
This crude misjudgement that had multiple roots. He took it for
granted that the modernization of the USSR and any other country
required a process of democratization. He had come to power with
this in mind and never questioned it – and no foreign leader apart
from Deng and Honecker ever tried to raise doubts. He also simply
assumed that time and morality were on the side of the Chinese
students – and it was far from unreasonable to think that Deng would
find it difficult to sustain the political autocracy in Beijing. He sympa-
thized with the student protesters, who carried posters demanding
some kind of perestroika such as he had introduced in his country; but
the terms of his visit disallowed him from talking to them. The ten-
sions between protesters and government intensified after he departed.
His sojourn in the Chinese capital had served to increase the intransi-
gence of the students. Placards were held extolling his advocacy of
democratization. They remained visible in subsequent days. State
authority was under direct challenge. The Chinese leadership split on
how to tackle it. In the ensuing controversy, Deng and Li purged those
like Zhao Ziyang who favoured concessions to student opinion. On
3–4 June repressive measures were undertaken. Tanks trundled across
Tiananmen Square and troops fired on protesters. China was going to
continue its economic reform without conceding political and civil
rights – and Deng did not care if this required violent measures.
The Beijing massacre appalled leaderships in Moscow and Wash-
ington. The USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies called for a peaceful
resolution of difficulties. But Gorbachëv told the Warsaw Pact’s
Political Consultative Committee in July that he would firmly resist
the temptation to interfere in Chinese affairs.^54 This was his credo in
world affairs. His priority was to complete the transformation of his
own country while strengthening the rapprochement with America.
The Americans, of course, had a deeper stake than the USSR in
China’s internal transformation. Without their investments and mili-
tary assistance, Deng would scarcely have made much economic
progress. The current question for the American administration was
about what steps might alleviate the trouble in Beijing while protect-