EPITAPH FOR WORLD COMMUNISM 393leadership, he indicated, would continue to work for the liberation of
the region’s peoples. But his emphasis was going to move from military
conflict to economic aid. On 21 February 1988 Adamishin delivered
a final draft on policy to Shevardnadze, who passed it on to Yazov,
Chebrikov and Dobrynin to consider, and on 14 March it was ratified
as official policy.^11
Shevardnadze encouraged Adamishin to apply the same policy to
the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. When Adamishin explained how bad
the situation had become for Mengistu in Ethiopia, the minister told
him to talk frankly at the Politburo’s Ethiopian Commission without
any worry about giving offence. On 15 April, at the commission meet-
ing that Yakovlev was chairing, Adamishin dismissed the Ethiopian
revolution as a lost cause that was costing millions of rubles and was
completely unjustifiable. The army commanders, with Kornienko in
their support, attacked his reasoning. But they failed to dismantle his
case, and Yakovlev phoned later to congratulate him on his courage
and analytical freshness.^12 Both Shevardnadze and Yakovlev appreci-
ated the importance of the African question for a settlement with
America. Shultz protested about the Cuban military intervention at his
next meeting with Shevardnadze on 10 May; he stressed how much it
discommoded the Americans. If Gromyko had still been minister, he
would have replied that it was none of America’s business. Shevard-
nadze made no attempt to dispute the point.^13 He had accepted that
change on Africa was necessary. The last thing he wanted, when
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was about to reach the
occasion of signature, was to fall out with Shultz.
The strange thing was that Gorbachëv suddenly became reluctant
to say anything about Africa; and Adamishin guessed that the General
Secretary had become worried about laying himself open to the charge
of betraying Mengistu’s revolution. Gorbachëv hardly needed to take
on an additional burden.^14 Shevardnadze had a personal preference to
continue to favour states and organizations on the political left. With
this in mind he and the new KGB Chairman Kryuchkov argued for
the USSR to assist countries of ‘socialist orientation’ in economically
developing parts of the world. Adamishin disagreed, contending that
the USSR needed to make a more drastic break with tradition.^15
Chernyaev concurred with Adamishin and told Gorbachëv that
it was high time to change direction. When Gorbachëv rebuffed his
arguments, Chernyaev on 10 October 1988 enlisted Yakovlev’s help in
placing the matter on the Politburo agenda. Chernyaev was aware that