394 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
the people of Ethiopia faced utter destitution; his solution was for
a joint effort by the Soviet and American leaderships to achieve ‘a
regulation of the Ethiopian regional problem’.^16 Gorbachëv was at first
averse to changing policy – quite possibly he did not want to incur
criticism by communist conservatives for surrendering yet another
traditional position in foreign policy to the Americans. But the logic of
Chernyaev’s standpoint gradually convinced Gorbachëv. The USSR
was wasting finance in propping up a brutal regime that was bringing
it into global political discredit. On 19 September 1989 the Politburo
approved a letter for General Varennikov, Deputy Defence Minister
after his return from Afghanistan, to take in person to Mengistu. The
Soviet leaders supported the peace initiative of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Eritrea; they asked Mengistu to accept the desirabil-
ity of opening talks with his enemies.^17 By 20 December the Politburo
had lost its stomach for military intervention in conflicts anywhere
outside the USSR’s frontiers. The Cuban forces were at last being with-
drawn from Ethiopia and, on Ryzhkov’s suggestion, no longer allowed
to receive Soviet material assistance.^18
Chernyaev and fellow aide Shakhnazarov called for a systematic
exposition of the new line. They wanted the USSR to abandon ‘the
ideological principle’ in dealing with the Third World; and they put
their case directly to Gorbachëv. They said that the USSR incurred
global opprobrium for aiding ‘the totalitarian regime of M. Gaddafi’,
fostering the ‘militaristic adventurism of H. Mengistu’ and taking sides
in the ‘endless tribally-based strife of South Yemen’s leaders’. They
called for Shevardnadze and Yakovlev to be asked to draft fresh guide-
lines for submission to the Politburo – and Gorbachëv passed on their
message to them.^19
The Libyan connection had been under review for more than a
year. On 8 February 1988 a decree was passed prohibiting the sales of
armaments to Gaddafi’s government. The motive was a wish not only
for improved ties with America but also to make budgetary savings.
The Soviet leadership was also reluctant to hand over weaponry and
equipment that the Libyans lacked the expertise to handle.^20 Shevard-
nadze gave a further signal of change on 8 January 1989, in one of his
last discussions with Shultz. They were talking about Muammar Gad-
dafi. The American side claimed that the Libyans were developing
chemical weapons at a secret chemical factory. Shevardnadze asked
how Washington expected to react; he added that the USSR had pro-
vided Libya with many advisers, who had given no indication that