EPITAPH FOR WORLD COMMUNISM 395anything illegal was under production. Basically he preferred a proper
investigation to take place before drastic measures were instigated. But
he made little attempt to restrain Shultz.^21 The reality was that Gaddafi
had become an embarrassment to the Soviet leaders, who were no
longer willing to expend their political capital in trying to save his
neck.
They found it harder to let go of Cuba. The island had nearly
brought the world into a catastrophic war between the superpowers in
1962 when Party First Secretary Khrushchëv tried to set up missile
bases there. His climbdown had preserved the peace, but at the price
of humiliation for the Soviet Union. America agreed to the secret
removal of its missile batteries in Turkey; it also offered a confidential
promise not to invade Cuba. Moscow in subsequent years propped up
the Cuban revolution with subsidies and political support.
Cuba was an awkward and expensive ally, and the Soviet leader-
ship always found Castro a handful. His fighting record and charisma
were impressive; his refusal to wilt under America’s pressure added
lustre to his reputation. Kremlin leaders were in awe of him. When
Shevardnadze visited Havana in October 1985, he asked for his
autograph and told a crowd: ‘You’re lucky that you live in a socialist
country and have a leader like comrade Fidel!’^22 Castro pulled no
punches about foreign policy, telling Shevardnadze that Brezhnev’s
Politburo had failed to think out the consequences of their invasion
of Afghanistan.^23 On his second trip to the island in October 1987
Shevardnadze found Castro unhappy about the Soviet reforms under
Gorbachëv and critical of the rewriting of Soviet history. Shevard-
nadze replied that Gorbachëv’s forthcoming book on perestroika was a
necessary corrective for the wrongs of the past. Stalin’s victims, includ-
ing Nikolai Bukharin, had to receive political rehabilitation. Criticism
of this nature, he reasoned, was a healthy phenomenon. This failed to
convince Castro, who admitted that if he engaged in the same policy
it would have to involve criticism of himself and Cuba’s other com-
munist veterans.^24 He had no intention of emulating Gorbachëv.
Castro expressed the hope that he would not forget to underline the
USSR’s great achievements in times gone by.^25
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Adamishin visited Castro on 30
March 1988. He scarcely got a word in edgeways in a conversation that
stretched over five hours. Adamishin learned that the Angolan mili-
tary intervention and the struggle against apartheid and its influence
in sub-Saharan Africa were the supreme cause in Castro’s life. Castro