396 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
had a grasp of the details of the war in Angola; he supervised current
operations, holding strategic discussions on a daily basis. He scoffed at
those Soviet and Cuban academics who did not understand that South
Africa’s forces were in trouble. He himself was willing to risk every-
thing for victory. He violently gesticulated; he leapt from his chair and
paced around the room. But when Adamishin stood up, the Cuban
leader told him to sit back down: there was room for only one emo-
tional person in the room. Castro became so heated that he forgot
to offer a cup of coffee to his visitor. Of course, he had spent half
a lifetime dazzling Soviet leaders with his revolutionary élan, and
Adamishin recognized Castro’s guile in the way he built up to a request
for Moscow to continue its assistance for the Angolan war effort.
Castro brushed aside Adamishin’s account of the growing difficulties
in Angola: he had made a definitive assessment and expected his
visitor to accept it.^26
Gorbachëv wanted to keep up the Cuban alliance despite Castro’s
mutterings about his perestroika. He had intended to visit the island at
the end of his visit to New York before the Armenian earthquake had
stopped him.^27 The trip was rescheduled for April. At the discussion in
the Politburo, Gorbachëv drew attention to Cuba’s demands on the
USSR’s budget. Castro received 20 billion rubles’ worth of oil annually
without having to pay in hard currency at a time when the Soviet
authorities could not afford to buy the amount of foreign products it
needed.^28
In Cuba, Gorbachëv witnessed how little could be bought in the
shops under the rationing system. Cuban people appeared at the limits
of endurance. He recognized Castro as a person of huge talent and
knowledge of world affairs, but there was a distinct coolness in their
first conversation. Gorbachëv saw through Castro’s exploitation of his
charm. He thought that the decades of American blockade had fos-
tered a definite ‘sectarianism’ in his manner of thinking. Gradually,
though, the atmosphere lightened and they started to speak usefully
with each other. As was his habit with the leaders of foreign commu-
nist states, Gorbachëv declined to put direct pressure on Castro – he
subsequently told his Politburo: ‘We’ve got to take Cuba as it is.’ He
was anyhow at one with Castro about the need to prevent interference
by the West in the island’s affairs. He promised to continue to provide
a military shield for Havana; he also gave an assurance that the USSR
regarded Cuba’s revolution as its own business. Castro for his part
agreed to recall Cuban military advisers from Nicaragua. This was