EPITAPH FOR WORLD COMMUNISM 397important for Gorbachëv in his search for improved relations with the
Americans.^29
The Nicaraguan question remained irksome for Washington.
Soviet leaders pondered how to handle the results of the forthcoming
election in that war-torn Central American country. On 13 February
1990 Shevardnadze and Yakovlev prepared a paper for the Politburo
about it, at a time when Secretary Baker was on a visit to Moscow.
They urged that the Sandinistas should be told to do nothing to pro-
vide the Americans with an excuse to deny recognition to the new
government; they recommended that if Daniel Ortega achieved his
expected victory, he should govern in a spirit of national reconcilia-
tion. The USSR ought to adopt a ‘pragmatic, de-ideologized’ policy
towards Ortega and his future ministers and prolong its suspension of
military supplies. Shevardnadze and Yakovlev suggested that Castro
should be told, tactfully but firmly, to give priority to reducing inter-
national tensions in the region. The Politburo accepted their ideas.^30
This was recognition that the Soviet Union had to accept a diminished
role for itself around the world. Apart from German reunification,
Soviet internal political and economic problems consumed almost
all the leadership’s time. It was time to discard the commitment to
Central America – or, indeed, to liberation movements elsewhere in
the world.
The USSR halted its military supplies to Angola, Mozambique and
Ethiopia. It also ceased shipments to Iraq, Libya and Yugoslavia despite
the potential loss of $7 billion a year. Communist governments that
failed to pay for their arms received the same treatment – Vietnam,
Cambodia, North Korea, Cuba and Mongolia fell into this category.
The USSR also terminated its financial credits to other states.^31 On 15
March 1990, when Najibullah pleaded for the maintenance of assist-
ance, Zaikov passed on the request to the Defence Ministry, which
replied that items to the value of 1.8 billion rubles could be spared. This
included twenty-three MiG fighters. The ministry promised to send six
highly qualified military specialists who could help with the necessary
training. But First Deputy Minister Mikhail Moiseev pointed out that
the military budget for 1990 had already been cut back. If the political
leadership required the ministry to bolster the Afghan government,
additional funds would have to be released.^32 Gorbachëv tried to per-
suade Najibullah that the Americans were starting to recognize the
dangers of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and Najibullah spoke
confidently about completing ‘normalization’ within two or three years,