404 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
a free national election. Every cliché about worldwide communism
was being dispelled. The Americans adapted themselves eagerly to
events, and Bush flew to Poland and had talks with Jaruzelski on 10
July. They agreed on the need to prepare for German reunification –
neither of them liked the idea, and Bush stressed that he wanted to
prevent anything happening that could jeopardize understandings
with the USSR. Jaruzelski welcomed his promise to eschew interfer-
ence in Polish affairs; he added that he expected to be able to appoint
a communist as the next Prime Minister in a coalition government.^18
Bush emphasized that America had difficulties with its own balance of
payments and could not plug the hole in Poland’s budget. Speaking to
the current Prime Minister, Mieczysław Rakowski, he indicated that
any American help would be tied to further progress towards dem -
ocracy and a market economy.^19 Travelling on to Hungary, Bush spoke
to Prime Minister Miklós Németh, a communist who wanted to form
a coalition ministry and introduce a programme of economic privat-
ization.^20 While he was in Budapest, Bush emphatically endorsed the
commitment to steady, peaceful reform; and he added his wish to do
nothing that might undermine Gorbachëv in Moscow.^21
Bush was straddling two lines of action. After months of indeci-
sion, he was keen to make progress in deals with the Soviet leadership;
at the same time he wanted to encourage the East European com-
munist reformers to continue along the path they had chosen.
Outwardly the Americans wished to show confidence in Gorbachëv’s
durability – and at a meeting of ambassadors in Moscow on 12 July
1989, Matlock denied that he was at any risk. He could see no danger
coming from Kryuchkov. (UK Ambassador Braithwaite was more
sceptical and thought that ‘we wouldn’t get advance warning of a
move against Gorbachëv’.)^22 When Matlock saw Yakovlev on 20 July
1989, he assured him that America had no desire to exploit the situation
to the USSR’s disadvantage. Bush and his administration saw the con-
tinu ation of perestroika as being in the American interest. Yakovlev
nevertheless blamed the President for causing mischief with his com-
ments about the Baltic region. When the conversation turned to arms
talks, Matlock commented that Bush had rejected Reagan’s dream of
completely liquidating nuclear weapons but still wanted to bring the
stockpiles down to a minimum.^23
Vadim Zagladin, who had joined Gorbachëv as a foreign policy
adviser, promised that the USSR would cooperate with whatever kind
of government emerged in Warsaw: ‘This is purely an internal Polish