406 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
undermined the bastions of the communist state. A quiet revolution
with near-universal popular support was proceeding.
The foundations of Poland’s post-war state order disintegrated and
the rumble of change was heard elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The
KGB’s Lev Shebarshin returned from East Germany with a depressing
account of his experience.^34 He later wrote that Gorbachëv ignored
what he and other intelligence leaders reported. Shebarshin claimed
that whenever the Soviet leaders took an interest in the KGB’s activity,
they only wanted to know about what Yeltsin was getting up to.^35
Politburo member Vadim Medvedev, who visited the country in the
summer, was another who warned about the simmering discontent.^36
Germany, even more than Poland, was the arena of the US–Soviet
contest in Europe. On both sides of the Iron Curtain there was con-
cern that if ever West and East Germany were reunited, the security of
neighbouring states could be put in jeopardy. The division of Germany
after 1945 suited the wishes of many governments. But if East Ger-
many were to collapse after the Polish fashion, all bets would be off,
and Gorbachëv started to consider whether the contagion could
spread. Margaret Thatcher felt a pang of sympathy with his plight. On
13 September, talking to UK Ambassador Braithwaite, she blurted out:
‘The poor man’s in trouble!’^37
Defence Minister Dmitri Yazov adjured the Central Committee on
19 September that ‘we don’t have the right to forget 1941’. He was
clearing his throat before making an indirect criticism of official
policy. Whereas Gorbachëv talked only of ‘sufficient’ defensive capa-
city, Yazov insisted that the USSR had to be sure of ‘absolutely reliable
defence’. The Defence Ministry evidently lacked confidence that the
country would be defensible if its forces went down to the minimum
that Gorbachëv demanded.^38 Yazov highlighted how the American
administration continued with the ‘modernization of its strategic
offensive forces and the realization of the Strategic Defense Initiative’
while making demands about bilateral arms reduction. Even Gor-
bachëv acknowledged America intended to maintain the deterrent
capacity of its nuclear weaponry – Bush had made this clear in a
speech he gave in Baltimore on 7 September.^39
The American President and his administration were surprised
and delighted about Solidarity’s advance on power, and the Soviet
leadership proved to be much less agitated about Poland than out-
siders had forecast. A working group of Shevardnadze, Yakovlev,
Yazov and Kryuchkov designed a practical policy. What they agreed