408 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
undermine the stability of the entire international situation and
could lead to threats to our security.^44Thatcher opposed ‘the destabilization of Eastern Europe or the disso-
lution of the Warsaw Pact’, and claimed that this was also Bush’s
opinion.^45 When she spoke again to the Soviet leader a few days later,
she railed against the idea of a greater Germany. Chernyaev recorded:
‘Thatcher, when she asked for her conversation with M. S. [Gorbachëv]
“not to be minuted”, was resolutely against “the unification of Ger-
many”. She wanted to tell him things that she could not say in public.’^46
Gorbachëv flew to East Berlin to celebrate the German Demo-
cratic Republic’s fortieth anniversary in early October. Though he was
reluctant to appear alongside Honecker, he could not afford to provoke
trouble by absenting himself. Joyous crowds greeted him. Placards
proclaimed in Russian: ‘Gorbachëv, you are our hope’. Hardly anybody
waved messages in favour of Honecker.^47 Gorbachëv played the role of
loyal comrade. Honecker refused to acknowledge any basic problems,
and Gorbachëv had to bite his tongue when Honecker ribbed him
about the empty shelves in Soviet stores.^48 Attending the East German
Politburo, Gorbachëv continued the charade and spoke as if Honecker
enjoyed his confidence.^49 Meanwhile out on the streets there was agi-
tation. Demonstrations were organized in Dresden. A rumour spread
that people would use the occasion of Gorbachëv’s visit to storm the
Berlin Wall. Such stories reached East Germans from West German
TV news programmes.^50 Honecker was helpless to take repressive
action without Gorbachëv’s approval. He could only warn Gorbachëv
that Hungary would soon be lost to the socialist fold as a result of
Kohl bribing the Hungarians to open their border with Austria.^51
Gorbachëv returned to Moscow on 7 October.^52 Leaving Honecker to
his fate, he told Shakhnazarov and Chernyaev that the East German
leader was ‘an arsehole’.^53
The communist leadership in East Germany flew into a frenzy.
Something had to be done about Honecker, and fast. Politburo mem-
bers Egon Krenz, Günther Schabowski and Harry Tisch secretly
arranged for Tisch to consult Gorbachëv about how to remove
Honecker from office. Tisch’s report on public opinion contained no
secret revelations. Gorbachëv was restrained in his reply: ‘That is noth-
ing new to me. The trip to the fortieth anniversary of the GDR was very
embarrassing. I only went out of a sense of duty and to help.’ He indi-
cated his support for what Honecker’s fellow communist leaders had in