22 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Reagan would face down the USSR. He wanted ‘to contain and over
time reverse Soviet expansionism’. At the same time he intended to
‘promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of
change in the Soviet Union towards a more pluralistic political and
economic system’. Though he wanted negotiations with Moscow,
this would only occur on the basis of ‘strict reciprocity and mutual
interest’. He aimed to make it understood in Moscow that ‘unaccept-
able be havior will incur costs that would outweigh any gains’.^37
America would modernize its armed forces. It was essential to sustain
a growth in defence expenditure over a lengthy period. The American
administration would avoid measures that might unduly ease the
USSR’s economic difficulties. Although Washington would lift the
embargo on wheat exports, the list of prohibited industrial goods was
to be lengthened. Reagan set his face against the transfer of any tech-
nology that had a potential for military use.^38
American policy should be to seize the initiative: ‘There are a
number of important weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet
Empire which the American should exploit.’ The directive envisaged
the ‘empire’ as involving Eastern Europe, Afghanistan and Cuba.
America should discriminate in favour of any East European countries
that rejected Moscow’s control of their foreign policy or were under-
taking some internal liberalization. On Afghanistan, the Americans
should aim at maximizing the cost to the USSR and bringing about a
military withdrawal. There should be assistance for efforts in Latin
America, the Caribbean and southern Africa to remove the Cuban
interventionist forces.^39 Communist China and Yugoslavia had spoken
out against Soviet expansionism so America should continue to sell
military equipment to China and increase financial credits to Yugosla-
via.^40 No ‘rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations with the Soviet
Union’ was likely as this could add to calls on the administration to
adopt a less assertive posture: ‘It is therefore essential that the Ameri-
can people understand and support US policy.’ The West needed to
reach a consensus on how to act together. Reagan wanted to show that
he desired a ‘stable and constructive long-term basis for US–Soviet
relations’ and not an ‘open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow’.^41
Reagan kept his options open. If Soviet international behaviour
were to worsen, perhaps by an invasion of Poland, ‘we would need to
consider extreme measures’.^42 This was not exactly a grand strategy for
the dismantling of communism in the USSR.^43 He set down guidelines
that sometimes criss-crossed with each other. He wished to challenge