REVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE 411He insisted that they wished to preserve the separate alliances of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact.^64 But what about East Germany? Gor-
bachëv said that the way forward was to encourage cooperation
among East Germany, West Germany and the USSR. He was caustic
about Eastern Europe. Poland and Hungary were bankrupt and had
no choice but to turn to the West for assistance. The Soviet Union
could not bail their astronomical debts.^65
On 3 November the Politburo dealt with questions of fiendish
complexity. One was about the need for flexible tactics to buy grain on
foreign markets. (Soviet leaders were reminded that Soviet agricultural
productivity was a long way below the American norm.) The next
topic on the agenda was interethnic conflicts across the USSR. The
Politburo then discussed how to handle a scheduled meeting with the
Papal Nuncio Angelo Sodano. As the date of Gorbachëv’s encounter
with the Pope drew near, it was crucial to prepare the ground for talks.
Only then did the Politburo get round to the momentous events in the
heart of Europe – a sign of Moscow’s fading influence over the situ-
ation as Krenz sought to impose his authority. Kryuchkov reported
that the KGB had information to the effect that half a million might
take to the streets of East Berlin and other German cities next day.
Gorbachëv asked simply whether Krenz stood any chance of survival.
Shevardnadze, advocate of support for Afghan communist leaders, did
not feel the same about the German Democratic Republic: ‘The best
thing would be if we ourselves took down the “Wall”.’ Kryuchkov mut-
tered: ‘If it’s taken down, things will be difficult for the East Germans.’^66
But not even the KGB leadership recommended measures of repres-
sion. The entire Politburo had an acute sense of its impotence.
Gorbachëv again emphasized that ‘the West’ had no interest in
German reunification; he reported that foreign leaders were trying to
provoke him into preventing reunification, and he refused to do their
dirty work for them. He himself favoured open negotiation with the
two Germanies, and suggested that this way of proceeding was in the
USSR’s basic interest.^67 Shevardnadze lamented the poor quality of
information that had reached Moscow about Poland and East Ger-
many.^68 But the main need was for the Politburo to deal with what was
already known. East Germans were taking to the streets in the cities. If
the Wall fell, the entire military and political settlement in Europe
since 1945 would be undermined. Gorbachëv had come to the point
of decision. He indicated to the Politburo that Krenz was not worth