REVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE 413would think this to be in their interest. As he saw it, the Kremlin lacked
accurate information about Poland, Hungary and East Germany.
German nationalism had been underestimated. He noted that the
French were thinking along the same lines. The USSR needed to im-
prove its analytical readiness. On Shevardnadze’s recommendation the
Soviet leadership established an internal working group whose task
was to keep watch on Eastern Europe and make recommendations on
policy.^74
Falin in the Party International Department felt that Gorbachëv
and Shevardnadze were too passive towards the Western powers.^75 He
saw the need to open a channel of communication with Bonn.
Chernyaev agreed, and he and Falin sent an emissary to West Ger-
many for talks with Kohl’s personal assistant Horst Teltschik. Falin was
brilliant, quirky and headstrong. He took an initiative which would
have been unimaginable in earlier Soviet times by instructing the
emissary to raise the possibility of forming a German confederation.
His idea was to protect East Germany against being gobbled up by
We s t G e r m a n y.^76 This had the unexpected effect of prodding Kohl and
Teltschik towards formulating a scheme for reunification. Kohl feared
that if he failed to intervene, events might overtake him.^77
His solution, as he told the Bundestag on 28 November, was a
ten-point plan for German unity that involved democratizing East
Germany and setting up a confederation with West Germany. He
made this on the strict understanding that a political and economic
transformation was set in motion that would be irreversible. The com-
munists had to give up their monopoly on power, negotiate with
opposition parties and groups and do the groundwork for speedy,
fair elections. He insisted that he was not laying down preconditions
or aiming to exercise tutelage; but it was hard to interpret his words
in any other way. Kohl noted that Hungary and Poland had accepted
help according to Bonn’s requirements. He could see no reason for
East Germany to reject this model. He omitted to mention that while
the Hungarians and Poles retained their national independence, he
intended nothing of the kind for the East Germans. Having spoken
to Hans Modrow, the communist reformer who had become East
German Prime Minister a few days earlier, he was willing to provide
assistance so long as the government conducted the radical change
that Kohl demanded. He tied all this to a concern for security through-
out Europe.^78