414 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Kohl’s failure to give advance warning of his Ten Points caused
fear in both Moscow and the Western capitals that West Germany was
bulldozing the architecture of post-war Europe without bothering to
consult the rest of the world. Bush alone was gentle, telling Kohl: ‘I
appreciate your Ten Points and your exposition on the future of Ger-
many.’^79 The NATO allies were furious. Thatcher’s nightmare was
becoming reality and Mitterrand, who had enjoyed his collaboration
with Kohl, felt traduced by having to learn about the Ten Points from
news agency dispatches. Trust between Paris and Bonn collapsed. The
consolation for French leaders was their thought that Moscow would
surely reject Kohl’s pretensions. And anyway would the East Germans,
being Prussians, wish to fall under the control of West Germany?^80
Mitterrand and Thatcher despaired after learning that Bush, who
shared their annoyance at Kohl’s abandonment of political etiquette,
endorsed the idea of a German confederation. The only remaining
hope for the French and British governments was that Gorbachëv
should veto the Kohl plan. Gorbachëv certainly wanted Kohl to know
how angry he was. Falin, the person whose actions had nudged Kohl
into formulating the Ten Points, urged Gorbachëv to exact the maxi-
mum of financial compensation from Bonn and teach him a lesson
about future behaviour.^81
Soviet leaders remained annoyed with Kohl, but none of them
thought it feasible to tear up his proposals. They had let the Poles deal
with the Polish question. Now they held back from unilateral interven-
tion in East Germany. It was the same story elsewhere in Eastern
Europe. Multiparty elections were being scheduled in Hungary as
the communist reformers sought to win popular legitimacy. On
10 November the Bulgarian Politburo removed Zhivkov from power
and replaced him with the communist reformer Petar Mladenov.
Czechoslovakia seethed with demonstrations against communism. On
28 November the communist leadership in Prague promised to dis-
mantle the one-party state structure. Gorbachëv heard the news with
trepidation but stuck consistently to the principle of self-determination.
He lacked the resources to turn back the tide of national revolutions.
He could not afford to fall out with the Americans. He anyway
believed that peoples should have freedom of choice. His solace was
the absence of serious dissent inside the Soviet elites about his policy
of non-interference. Only the Poles had yet come near to completing
their revolution, but others were following them. The communist