THE MALTA SUMMIT 417treaties with the USSR; he was proposing a policy of inactivity as being
the best for the American administration.
Others in the administration rejected this as being too passive a
way to deal with the situation. Scowcroft advised the President to cam-
paign at the National Security Council to repeal the Jackson–Vanik
amendment to the National Security Council. He discouraged any-
thing more than this at the next summit, emphasizing that the time
had not arrived for the USSR to gain entrance to GATT, the IMF or
the World Bank.^4 Matlock, cabling from the Moscow embassy, recom-
mended the President at least to signal his support for perestroika.
But he opposed any offer of financial assistance. In his opinion, the
Kremlin needed to absorb the economic facts of life whereas a new
Marshall Plan would only slow down the learning process. If Soviet
leaders wanted to attract American private companies, they had to
transform the entire commercial and legal environment in the USSR
- and Gorbachëv needed to be told about this prerequisite.^5
Bush had a quite different approach in mind. He certainly knew
that the Kremlin’s negotiating strength was steeply on the wane. He
told Kohl:
We recognize the Soviet Union as a sovereign nation that has
great pride. Shevardnadze said recently that he didn’t want
America to ‘bail us out’. I will be sensitive, but will want to see
what I can do to help. We want him to succeed. In the briefings I
have had, it is apparent that the Soviet economy is much worse
than I realized before in-depth study. I will help, but in a sensitive
way.^6Quite what he meant by sensitivity is not clear. He certainly had no
intention of emptying his own treasury.
His main ambition, after a year of applied caution, was to keep his
personal freedom to improvise at the summit. Something told him that
this was the wisest way to extract the best results from the talks at a
time when world politics were unstable. He asked Gorbachëv to agree
to an open agenda; he himself promised not to spring any surprise
on him.^7 When Baker heard of this, he warned Bush that Gorbachëv
might do something disconcerting. He might, for example, make pro-
posals for the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. He would
surely demand the end of restrictions on the USSR’s integration in the
world economy. He would oppose German reunification. Baker coun-
selled against making any economic concessions until Gorbachëv had