418 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
introduced an acceptable law on freedom of emigration. America’s
interest, in his opinion, lay in achieving stability, security and democ-
racy in Eastern Europe after its revolutionary upsurge. Baker advised
Bush to assure Gorbachëv that he would do nothing to undermine
Gorbachëv’s authority in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; but the Presi-
dent should at the same time reaffirm America’s non-recognition of
those Soviet Baltic republics. Bush should also draw attention to the
discrepancy between Gorbachëv’s rhetoric and the Kremlin’s subversive
practices in the Third World.^8
Most leading officials in the American administration were push-
ing in the same direction: the summit ought not to become an
occasion for undesirable concessions. Chernyaev heard that the CIA
gave Gorbachëv six more months in power.^9 He noted that most
Western commentators wrote approvingly about perestroika’s p o t e n -
tial to transform the economy – the most prominent exceptions were
Richard Pipes and Zbigniew Brzezinski. According to Chernyaev,
the most impressive pieces were those which accepted that a reformed
USSR was not going to turn into ‘a Western society’ or produce ‘a
Soviet economic miracle’. He noted that they usually suggested the
need for Gorbachëv to achieve further breakthroughs in policy.
Chernyaev thought they underestimated the scale of difficulties that
faced the reformers. Direct resistance impeded progress less than the
weak momentum supplied by Soviet society for its own transforma-
tion. Gorbachëv could not do everything alone.^10
The usual group of advisers prepared guidelines on arms talks
strategy for him in advance of his departure for America. The Big Five
recommended a set of firm demands. Zaikov called for an agreement
to renounce ‘the creation of weaponry on new physical principles’ –
whether this was yet another attempt to undermine the Strategic
Defense Initiative, he did not make clear. He also argued for obtaining
agreement on how the two superpowers would manage industrial
demilitarization; but again he was writing in unspecific terms. Bakla-
nov added a request for a ban on anti-satellite weapons. He wanted
Gorbachëv to warn the Americans that, now that the Politburo was
dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar station, the American installations
at Thule and Fylingdales threatened progress.^11 Zaikov could handle
Baklanov without undue difficulty at the Big Five. The difficulty was
that Baklanov was saying things that everyone knew reflected feelings
to be found widely in the military-industrial complex. Gorbachëv and
Zaikov had quietened the critics since 1985, but both were conscious