THE MALTA SUMMIT 419that things could crumble. At times it was prudent to agree to sterner
guidelines than they thought that Gorbachëv would be able to impose
on the Americans at the talks.
Soviet leaders were beginning to panic as the internal and external
difficulties grew. Gorbachëv focused on the economic crisis. For weeks
he and Ryzhkov had been trying to quicken the conversion of industry
to the needs of consumers. Ryzhkov intended to remove 250 billion
rubles from the budget for defence by the year 2005. Gorbachëv
strongly backed him. With people from the military-industrial com-
plex present, he stressed: ‘You understand that we’re shifting you so
that you’re face to face with the needs of the people. And all without
any loss in security.’^12 The problem was that financial reallocations
alone were not going to stave off ruin. The economy went from bad to
worse. On 29 November, after reaching Rome, Gorbachëv held a dis-
cussion with his aides and leading figures from the arts. It was put to
him that nothing good could happen until he rented out the collective
farms. He rejected the advice: ‘I don’t want us to get yet another vari-
ant of collectivization. What? Should we cut society at the knee yet
again? If society isn’t yet mature and if initiative can’t be awakened in
it, we won’t achieve anything.’ His feelings were poignant and from the
heart. Admitting that he lacked academic qualifications, he regretted
that none of the prominent scholars in the room could tell him how to
rescue the USSR.^13
He was disallowing the proposal for a faster and deeper introduc-
tion of the market economy. If Ambassador Matlock had been privy to
the debate, he would have felt vindicated. Gorbachev in the same
breath appeared to want change and no change. He also had other
things that were bothering him, and the Italian trip gave him a chance
to see what he could do about them.
On 1 December he met Pope John Paul II in the Vatican. He had
prepared the ground through talks in Moscow with Cardinal Casaroli
in the summer. There had been a common emphasis on the wish for
world peace, and Gorbachëv had assured the Vatican of the official
tolerance that would always be shown to the Catholic Church.^14 The
Pope, wearing a white soutane, now gave him an audience of an hour
and twenty minutes and made no fuss about speaking in Russian.
Casaroli, the overseer of policy in Eastern Europe, sat by the Pope’s
side. It was a warm conversation that left Gorbachëv thinking that
their ideas overlapped. The Pope laid emphasis on peace in the world
and thanked Gorbachëv for his recent efforts; he expressed gratitude