THE MALTA SUMMIT 423as historic. They were completing a process that began when Reagan
and Gorbachëv had started to talk about world peace. The Cold War
was over, completely finished. As the stormy weather died down over
the northern Mediterranean, the two delegations could fly from Valletta
with the confidence that their countries no longer confronted each
other as enemy powers. Shevardnadze told aides: ‘This is a much more
significant breakthrough than in Reykjavik. Reykjavik was bloated
whereas here the entire content corresponds to the scale of the meet-
ing.’^31
The next step was to inform the allies – a vital task at a time of
tumultuous change in Eastern Europe. Bush sent Scowcroft and
Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger to Tokyo and Beijing to deliver
briefings.^32 He himself met Kohl on 3 December and told him that
Gorbachëv thought Kohl was in too much of a hurry. Kohl replied
that things were happening altogether too fast in East Germany; he
did not intend to let them get out of hand, and said he had already
assured Gorbachëv about this. He admitted that Andreotti and other
leaders in Western Europe felt some concern about his Ten Points. He
denied being reckless. He said that when people like Kissinger called
for a two-year delay before unification, they showed no comprehen-
sion of the depths of the East German economic crisis. Postponement
of action, Kohl said, could result in a disaster. He asserted that Poland
and Hungary would have collapsed but for the assistance that West
Germany and America were rendering. He rejected Thatcher’s attitude,
saying: ‘She thinks history is not just. Germany is so rich and Great
Britain is struggling. They won a war but lost an empire and their
economy. She does the wrong thing. She should try to bind the
Germans into the European Community.’^33
Flying back to Washington, Bush gave his account of the Malta
discussions to the National Security Council on 5 December. Scow-
croft advised him to stress the need for urgent work to prepare arms
reduction plans for the next summit with the Soviet leader.^34 The
Americans were pleased with what they had achieved at the summit.
The main thing was that Gorbachëv had made no difficult demands.
There was a firm possibility of stabilizing an Eastern Europe free from
any Soviet military menace, and Gorbachëv and Bush could begin to
add to the arms reduction understandings that were Reagan’s legacy.
On 4 December Gorbachëv reported to the Warsaw Pact leaders
in Moscow. He was speaking in circumstances that nobody present
would have found imaginable a few months earlier. Around the table