THE MALTA SUMMIT 425more dangerous than at any time in the Cold War. His remedy was to
strengthen economic linkages in Eastern Europe and to hold an inter-
national conference of communist parties. He hit the tablecloth with
the palms of his hands and, after a dramatic pause, commented: ‘We
simply can’t understand why it’s necessary to discredit several former
leaders of fraternal parties and states.’^42
When Gorbachëv proposed a joint denunciation of the 1968 in -
vasion of Czechoslovakia, Ceauşescu interjected that he had done this
very thing at the time; he now urged Gorbachëv to withdraw Soviet
forces from Czechoslovak territory. Arguments broke out as a draft
communiqué was passed from hand to hand – Mazowiecki versus
Ryzhkov, Modrow versus Mazowiecki, Krenz versus Ceauşescu, even
Jaruzelski versus Gorbachëv. The Hungarians were not against a Soviet
pull-out from the region as a whole but were wary about picking out
just one country such as Czechoslovakia. Ceauşescu objected to the
time that all this was taking. Quick as a flash, Gorbachëv said: ‘Plural-
ism, comrade Ceauşescu! For us this has long been the norm!’^43 The
meeting ended with less applause for Gorbachëv than had been cus-
tomary. This was of little surprise. Apart from Mladenov, nobody
wanted to appear a Moscow stooge. And everyone understood the
need to take Gorbachëv’s optimism with a pinch of salt. Politics were
in a condition of intense volatility. Lurking in the minds of East Euro-
peans was the feeling that the future of the region was going to be
dominated by a greater Germany. The Cold War was ending. New
fears were growing as old fears faded.
Gorbachëv had a trickier task when reporting to his own Central
Committee on 9 December. He again struck an optimistic note: Bush
had given way on a lot, having promised to try to get the Jackson–
Vanik amendment repealed so as to allow the USSR to buy American
technology without restriction. America, Gorbachëv claimed, was
likely to supply financial credits and make big investments in the
Soviet economy – an exaggeration, not to say fabrication.^44 Alexander
Melnikov, First Secretary of the Kemerovo Party Provincial Commit-
tee, criticized the handling of foreign policy. He charged that not even
the entire Politburo was taking the big decisions. He wanted the Cen-
tral Committee to have a greater influence. He noted that ‘the entire
bourgeois world’ plus the Pope and every past and present adversary
of the party pronounced approval of the leadership’s course in reforms.
Melnikov argued that this at the very least should give pause for
thought – and the sooner, the better.^45 Gorbachëv lost patience as