37. REDRAWING THE MAP OF EUROPE
The weeks after the Malta summit witnessed the fastest and least
predictable mutation in East European politics since the late 1940s.
America and the USSR were agreed on the need to avoid violence and
ensure stability. They concurred that the Cold War was coming to
a close. But problems could arise as the newly free states of the con-
tinent’s eastern half gave consideration to the borders established in
- Reagan and Gorbachëv had begun their rapprochement by
focusing on nuclear arms reduction, and the process was continuing
under Bush. The chances of success suddenly depended on what hap-
pened to the map of Europe – and nowhere was cartographically more
sensitive than East Germany.
On 5 December Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze held talks with
Genscher in Moscow. They insisted that the German Democratic
Republic was still ‘the partner and ally’ of the USSR. Genscher
reported that Bush had told Kohl that he favoured the idea of a new
confederation across German territory. This inflamed Gorbachëv, who
felt that the NATO powers were doing things behind his back. He
accused Kohl of trying to lord it over the East Germans.^1 Kohl had
promised to do nothing to destabilize East Germany but then pro-
ceeded to announce his Ten Points. Gorbachëv called this a cardinal
error; he said that if West Germany valued cooperation with the Soviet
Union, this way of doing things had to stop.^2 He spoke more calmly
next day on the phone to Mitterrand, who expressed alarm about
Kohl’s failure to recognize the Polish western frontier. Gorbachëv
repeated his concerns about the idea of a confederation, the members
of which usually had a single foreign and security policy; such an
outcome, he said, would undermine the Warsaw Pact.^3 Although
Mitterrand had no desire to see Germany reunited, he could see no
way of halting the process; and he was hardly eager to intervene after
hearing from Gorbachëv that he did not intend to act against Kohl.^4