REDRAWING THE MAP OF EUROPE 429Ceauşescu, approached the Soviet Ambassador in Bucharest and
handed over a letter with a proposal to overthrow the dictator. The
consistent policy in Moscow was to encourage the East European
reformers to conduct the necessary changes through their own efforts.
Gorbachëv endorsed the embassy’s reaction: ‘Correct: no reaction.
We’re not interfering in their affairs.’^12 Gorbachëv could see for himself
at the Political Consultative Committee meeting on 4 December 1989
that the Romanian President was alarmed about the possibility of
sharing the fate of Honecker and Zhivkov.^13 The disturbances in Timi-
soara intensified, and Shevardnadze feared the worst. He told Enrique
Barón Crespo, president of the European Parliament and a leader of
Spain’s Socialist Workers Party, that if Ceauşescu chose to act ‘against
his people’, there would be a tragedy like the Tbilisi butchery earlier in
the year.^14
So it very nearly proved to be. But on 21 December, when
Ceauşescu appeared on the balcony of the Central Committee build-
ing in Bucharest, the crowd forgot its fear of the Securitate. Instead of
applauding, they booed. Ceauşescu sensed mortal danger and fled by
helicopter. The administration fell apart, and the party and army lead-
ers crossed over into rebellion. Demonstrations filled the streets of all
Romanian cities. Ceauşescu and his wife were captured. A summary
trial was held on 25 December before they were led out to be shot.
The Politburo in Moscow had given recognition to the National
Salvation Front two days earlier. It wanted the Romanians to sort out
their own revolution. It approved measures to prevent Romanian-
speaking Moldavians from crossing the Soviet border and joining in
the protests. Priority was given to maintaining stability in the USSR.^15
But if the Warsaw Pact was to have a future, the Kremlin leadership
had to find willing partners in Eastern Europe. On 3 January 1990, less
than two weeks after the collapse of the Romanian communist admin-
istration, Shevardnadze visited Bucharest. Some in his entourage
queried whether this made sense. Shevardnadze cut them short. Only
by going in person to Romania, he insisted, could he work out how to
restore Soviet influence.^16 He found it an encouraging experience.
President Ion Iliescu appeared sympathetic to his rationale for the
avoidance of strategic instability.^17 Somehow, Shevardnadze told him-
self on the flight back to Moscow, the Warsaw Pact would survive.
However changeable the conditions might be, the Soviet Union could
still succeed in discovering a path to its own ‘salvation’ in a Europe
that was no longer divided between East and West.^18