430 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
The German question mattered more than any speculation about
the prospects for the Warsaw Pact. East Germany was in turmoil, and
Kohl dropped the idea of a confederation and advocated a rapid
merger that would prevent economic disaster.^19 On 26 January Gor-
bachëv held an informal gathering on Old Square, where he said: ‘It is
now already clear that unification is inevitable, and we don’t have the
moral right to oppose it.’^20 Kryuchkov agreed: ‘Modrow is a transitory
figure; [he] behaves on the basis of concessions but soon there’ll be
nothing for him to concede.’ In Kryuchkov’s opinion, it was crucial for
the Soviet media to prepare popular opinion for what was about to
occur.^21 Gorbachëv declared: ‘In these conditions we have to defend
the interests of our country to the utmost, secure a recognition of
borders, a peace treaty together with the departure of the Federal
Republic of Germany from NATO – or at least with the withdrawal of
foreign troops and the demilitarization of all Germany.’^22
On 29 January the Warsaw Pact held a discussion about the size of
conventional forces adequate to preserve peace and stability.^23 The
Kremlin’s cooperation was a requirement for the withdrawal of Soviet
forces. It was important that nothing took place near the garrisons that
might provoke trouble. Soviet officials explained to Czechoslovakia’s
President Havel that the USSR did not yet have enough housing in the
USSR for the returning troops. For them, this was no trivial matter.
Havel retorted that the Soviet leadership had received plenty of time to
make its preparations. Surely, he said, its intelligence agencies had
been telling them for a long while about what people were thinking in
Eastern Europe.^24 But he soon calmed down. Like the other new
rulers, he was wary of annoying the USSR at a time when nobody
could yet be sure about whether the new Germany would recognize
Europe’s post-war frontiers. He avoided making political trouble for
the Soviet leadership. If Gorbachëv were to fall from power in Moscow,
nobody could say what kind of government might emerge in its place.
The leaders of the anticommunist revolutions sympathized with the
secessionist movements in the USSR; but apart from a few official
visits by Polish politicians to Kiev and Vilnius, it was noticeable that
they withheld active assistance to the popular fronts of the Soviet
republics.
Chief of the General Staff Moiseev objected to how Havel had
spoken: ‘We’re not some second-class power for anyone to talk to us
like that.’ This time it was Shevardnadze who expressed exasperation:
‘You were told four years ago about the mood in Hungary, Czechoslo-