REDRAWING THE MAP OF EUROPE 433had difficulty with American conservatives who opposed his proposal
to relax the CoCom restrictions on trade with the USSR.^42
His listeners brought up their grumbles about the mujahidin, the
Jackson–Vanik amendment and America’s armed intervention in
Panama; they also asked him to explain American policy on the Soviet
republics of the Baltic. Akhromeev pushed him to accept a morato-
rium on nuclear bomb test explosions. Baker made no concessions
other than promising to consider measures to reduce the CoCom
technological restrictions. He refused to give a commitment to per-
mitting the purchase of computer licences. He advocated the new
Germany’s membership of NATO.^43
Gorbachëv received Kohl in Moscow on the same day. They agreed
that Germany should be unified in a calm fashion, and Kohl reported
on the growing problems that faced the East German leadership in
advance of the forthcoming elections. The currency was volatile. There
was a continual exodus of people to West Germany. Political group-
ings were engaged in furious attacks on each other. The whole situation
was dangerously febrile. He stressed that although he wanted to recog-
nize the existing frontier with Poland and Czechoslovakia, he still
needed to assure himself of support in German public opinion. He
tried to assure the USSR that nothing would take place against the
interests of Soviet security: ‘We consider that NATO mustn’t expand
the sphere of its activity.’ He indicated that he understood the task that
Gorbachëv was shouldering in explaining this to the Soviet people.
It was a pleasant exchange of opinions and Gorbachëv thanked Kohl
for that.^44
Next day, on 11 February, Baker and Shevardnadze sped from
Moscow to the Open Skies Conference which was about to start in
Ottawa. The agenda included the removal of restrictions on East–West
travel. Shevardnadze also wanted to discuss the German question, and
he and Baker held six negotiating sessions in the course of one and a
half days.^45 When Baker talked about the timing of German reunifica-
tion, Shevardnadze said he would have to consult the Politburo.^46 He
told Genscher that even a reunified country was far from a settled
common objective. Genscher pointed out that Gorbachëv and Kohl
had already recognized the principle in a joint communiqué; but
Shevardnadze and his team insisted on moving slowly on German
affairs, and the statement agreed with Baker contained no mention of
the word ‘reunification’.^47 Shevardnadze was pleased with his perform-
ance, calling it ‘the beautiful harvest of Ottawa’.^48 On his return to