434 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Moscow, Shevardnadze held a discussion with his ministry collegium.
His opinion was that Germany ought to attain its unity in the course
of a lengthy process that avoided sudden improvisation; and he wanted
to ensure the introduction of reliable security structures for Europe as
a whole.^49
Kryuchkov resented the way that things were going on a broader
front. In the KGB’s annual report to Gorbachëv as Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet, he claimed that the priority had been to discover
the ‘military-strategic plans of the enemy’. Despite the recent warmth
of US–USSR diplomacy, it remained the KGB’s task to look for ‘signs
of preparations for a possible sudden unleashing of a nuclear-missile
war’.^50 Surveillance continued on ‘nationalist, anti-socialist, extremist
forces’ in the USSR; but Kryuchkov added that his agency had helped
with the rehabilitation of 838,630 Soviet citizens subjected to repres-
sion in the 1930s and 1940s.^51 Other activities were more traditional
for the KGB. It continued to conduct scientific and industrial espion-
age on behalf of the USSR’s military needs. (Evidently Kryuchkov
felt that such needs took precedence over those of ill-provided Soviet
consumers.) As regards the inspections of Soviet forces that were pre-
scribed under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the KGB
alleged that the CIA had exploited the opportunity to send a hundred
agents into the USSR. He sounded an alarm about how foreign firms
were taking advantage of the new cooperatives that were springing up
in Moscow; he also warned about the threat to constitutional order in
the Baltic republics.^52
On 28 February Bush phoned Gorbachëv with a report on his
talks with Kohl. The Americans and West Germans were of the opin-
ion that the new Germany should belong to NATO. When Gorbachëv
demurred, Bush tried to win him over by promising that East Ger-
many would retain special separate status that would mollify the
USSR’s concerns; and he sensed a willingness on the Soviet side to
continue to negotiate.^53 But Gorbachëv also expressed a deep worry.
Kohl had still not declared his acceptance of the post-war frontiers in
Europe, and Gorbachëv could see no possibility of progress until there
was a change of attitude in Bonn.^54
In March, as public criticisms of his policies grew in strength,
Gorbachëv strove to boost his status by getting the Supreme Soviet to
change his title from Chairman to President. This was done without
reference to the electorate. The Supreme Soviet readily endorsed what
he requested, but its obedience only papered over the cracks in the