436 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
growing criticism in Moscow of the abandonment of communist
traditions. Shevardnadze warned that perestroika was vulnerable to
shocks. If it came to an end, a dictator could rise to power in the
USSR. Genscher, only half-jokingly, replied that Shevardnadze was
talking like a Western hawk.^58
On 18 March, in line with Kohl’s demands, elections were held
in East Germany. The communists had campaigned as the Party of
Democratic Socialism; like others in Europe, east and west, they rec-
ognized that the word ‘communism’ was toxic in the opinion of the
electorate. Nevertheless, the Party of Democratic Socialism came only
third in the contest; and groups of ex-dissidents who wanted to slow
down the process of merging the two Germanies were trounced. Vic-
tory went by a large margin to the political coalition led by Christian
Democrats under Lothar de Maizière – and de Maizière replaced
Modrow as Prime Minister.^59
Gorbachëv could not afford to become exclusively preoccupied
with the German question. Politics in Moscow was hectic as never
earlier. Chief of the General Staff Moiseev and Central Committee
Secretary Baklanov felt that the USSR was offering to give up too
many of its strategic nuclear forces. Why should the Soviet side destroy
more missiles than America? At the Big Five meeting on 10 March,
Moiseev had attacked Shevardnadze in his absence.^60 Baklanov wrote
to Gorbachëv that the proposal for a fifty per cent reduction in strateg-
ic weapons was being mishandled; he regretted that military parity
was no longer the leadership’s official goal. Gorbachëv passed every-
thing over to Zaikov’s Politburo Commission. As ever, he wanted there
to be collective responsibility. Zaikov took Baklanov’s initiative as an
attack on his recent work. Calm returned only on 30 March, when
Zaikov reconvened the Big Five and, at Gorbachëv’s suggestion, took
note of Baklanov’s points without agreeing to change policy. Stress
was laid on the need for ‘constructive approaches’ in the talks with
America.^61 Together with Moiseev, Baklanov criticized Gorbachëv
himself for allowing a collapse in the country’s defensive capacity. He
asked for his opinion to be recorded separately from the rest of the Big
Five.^62
As a concession to the critics, Gorbachëv designated Akhromeev to
lead the team to talk to the American working group in Washington.
Akhromeev had recently expressed concern about the affects of pere-
stroika by declaring: ‘For seventy years the Americans have attempted