REDRAWING THE MAP OF EUROPE 437to destroy our Union and they’ve finally achieved their end.’ Deputy
Foreign Affairs Minister Bessmertnykh added: ‘It’s not they who have
destroyed it but we ourselves.’^63
The Politburo nevertheless approved the Big Five’s advice; it also
highlighted the need to demand that the new Germany should stay
out of NATO. Shevardnadze was to object to recent American state-
ments, including the conditions being laid down for private companies
to invest in the USSR.^64 Gorbachëv wrote a letter for Shevardnadze to
hand over to Bush in preparation for a bilateral agreement to halve the
number of strategic nuclear weapons.^65 Shevardnadze set off on his
mission pleased that the general line of policy had been confirmed.
But he felt the need to explain to Baker that the Soviet side felt a grow-
ing dislike of attempts to stampede it into decisions. The conversations
were less amicable than in the recent past.^66 Baker repeated his objec-
tion to the USSR’s involvement with Cuba and to Najibullah’s retention
of power in Afghanistan. Shevardnadze replied that foreign powers
had no business in bringing down a country’s rulers. These were rou-
tine exchanges. But when Baker mentioned that two or three members
of the Warsaw Pact were in favour of the new Germany joining NATO,
Shevardnadze grew agitated and demanded that the USSR should be
centrally involved in any decision.^67
Apparently he also indicated that the Kremlin’s standpoint was not
immutable.^68 Soviet critics of Shevardnadze and Gorbachëv worried
that they were edging towards unacceptable compromises. The situa-
tion was aggravated by revelations about the USSR’s past dealings
with allies in Eastern Europe. Moscow had sold SS-23s to Bulgaria,
East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Shevardnadze asked the Americans
to have personal confidence in him and Gorbachëv. At a Washington
press conference on 6 April he claimed that neither of them had known
about the sale of those missiles; he added that the Soviet Union had
scrupulously observed the terms of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty.^69 Akhromeev took offence at Shevardnadze’s words. He
was to claim that Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze had known about the
sale all along and to speculate that Shevardnadze improvised an answer
which involved a blatant untruth because he had not mastered his min-
isterial brief. When Akhromeev’s opportunity arose to set the record
straight at the American Senate Armed Services Committee a month
later, his speech removed the taint which, in his opinion, had attached
itself to the reputation of the Soviet armed forces.^70
On the return flight to Moscow, Akhromeev accentuated his