438 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
unease about trends in the negotiations. Shevardnadze sensed political
danger after vain attempts to win him over. Akhromeev sat in his
plane seat in stony silence.^71 Shevardnadze recognized that Akhro-
meev was right that the Americans were asking the USSR to scrap
more strategic missiles than themselves.^72 Akhromeev was the most
malleable of the leading military figures; Gorbachëv and Shevard-
nadze had the unenviable task of persuading the rest of the military
lobby, who were far less flexible, that defensive sufficiency was a better
criterion for strategic preparation – an argument they found easier to
put to a visiting delegation of US Senators led by John Glenn than
to make before their own General Staff.^73
The one bright light in the situation was that the West Germans
told the Americans that they would openly recognize Europe’s existing
frontiers.^74 Kohl had finally done what had been demanded of him,
and Chernyaev and Shakhnazarov advised Gorbachëv to let Germany
decide on its own constitutional and military future. Falin took the
opposite approach. Recalling the year 1941, he cautioned that the new
Germany might turn against Russia. On 18 April he sent a memoran-
dum to Gorbachëv arguing for the need to compel the Germans to
stay out of NATO.^75 Gorbachëv said that the safest way of handling
Germany after reunification was to impose dual membership of NATO
and the Warsaw Pact.^76 Shevardnadze warned Genscher against push-
ing too hard since it was no longer inconceivable that Gorbachëv
would lose power as popular dissatisfaction with his economic man-
agement rose and political criticism increased in the Supreme Soviet
and the media. A different government, he said, was unlikely to
accommodate Chancellor Kohl’s demands.^77 Baker at last appreciated
the risks of upsetting the framework of cooperation that Reagan had
established. Recognizing Shevardnadze as an indispensable collabor-
ator, he asked his officials to pass on his ‘deep gratitude’ for the work
that the Foreign Affairs Minister had accomplished.^78 Shevardnadze
for his part assured Baker: ‘I don’t want a dispute about which of us is
being the more generous in concessions.’^79
The international situation, however, remained fraught. American
and British authorities came to the Foreign Affairs Ministry with dis-
turbing information about the USSR’s illegal production of biological
weapons. The Politburo’s experts had assured it that their Soviet scien-
tists restricted their research to defensive purposes.^80 America and the
United Kingdom rejected the claim. On 14 May ambassadors Matlock
and Braithwaite told Deputy Minister Bessmertnykh that Moscow