REDRAWING THE MAP OF EUROPE 439must bring the programme quickly to a close. Braithwaite stressed that
Zaikov knew all about what was going on.^81 Matlock added that Baker
would want to discuss the matter with Shevardnadze at the next
opportunity.^82
Zaikov reported that a programme had indeed been under way in
breach of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. He contended
that the USSR had done this after discovering that NATO countries
were circumventing their treaty obligations by basing facilities in third
countries. The Soviet programme had been halted in 1989 when the
scientist Vladimir Pasechnik defected to the United Kingdom and
informed the British authorities about what was happening. Zaikov
assured Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze that steps had been taken to
open the research laboratories to inspection by 1990.^83 Under Western
pressure, the decision was taken to end the programme. The produc-
tion of chemical weapons was also to cease, and the Soviet and
American administrations agreed on destroying their stockpiles by
- Chief of the General Staff Moiseev expostulated that the USSR
lacked the necessary facilities.^84 The Big Five recommended that funds
should be made available.^85
The talks were kept under wraps since America and Britain wanted
to avoid doing anything that might undermine Gorbachëv. Not that
every Western politician behaved tactfully: US Defense Secretary
Cheney rocked the boat by predicting that Gorbachëv would falter
and probably be replaced by someone hostile to the West.^86 The Soviet
military threat remained of deep concern for him.^87 He was saying
what many in the Bush administration had always thought but felt it
impolitic to express. Soviet leaders were aware of the growing scepti-
cism and Shevardnadze pleaded with Genscher to recognize the acute
problems that Gorbachëv was facing. The military victory over the
Third Reich in 1945 had turned the USSR into a superpower, and its
people were not going to forgive the current leadership if it were
to lose that status.^88 When Shevardnadze met Baker on 1 May, he
reminded him about the sacrifices made by Soviet citizens in defeating
Nazi Germany. He stressed that the enemies of perestroika were
capable of embarrassing Gorbachëv over the German question.^89
Western powers had a choice: either to deal gently with Gorbachëv or
to take the risk of enabling his adversaries to get rid of him. The stakes
could not be higher.
On 3 May Baker set out American purposes at a NATO Council
meeting in Brussels. He stressed that the planned arms reductions did