THE NEW GERMANY 443hard it was for Soviet people, who had lost so many millions of lives in
the war against the Third Reich, to look calmly upon the changed situ-
ation in Eastern Europe. He asked Gorbachëv to understand his own
political difficulties over Lithuania. When Gorbachëv insisted that he
intended to bring economic reform to the USSR, Bush pointed out
that ‘you’ve got to go all the way or it won’t be effective’. He added that
‘it’s just like being pregnant – you can’t be a little bit pregnant’. Quick
as a flash, Gorbachëv replied: ‘Well, you can’t have a baby in the first
month either – it takes nine months, and you want to be careful that
you don’t have an abortion along the way.’ The point impressed Bush.^12
But he still could not give Gorbachëv the trade agreement that the
Soviet leaders wanted. As he had said repeatedly, the Vanik-Jackson
amendment had yet to be repealed. Gorbachëv became ‘very agitated’
at this and warned Bush that there was going to be a ‘disaster’ in the
USSR unless external funds became available.^13 This was the first time
that he talked this way. At Malta he had been the enabler of East Euro-
pean liberation; now he was a needy supplicant.
Gorbachëv turned to Falin for help in explaining to the Americans
why East Germany stayed important to the USSR. A gap was opening
between Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze. Falin later claimed that Gor-
bachëv told him: ‘We were both right not to listen to Eduard. Of course,
it’s difficult to calculate what will concretely happen, but the Americans
do have reserve variants or also variants about Germany’s membership
of NATO.’^14 Gorbachëv and Bush met without their advisers and agreed
on an important compromise. They agreed that USSR would accept the
new Germany’s membership of NATO if the peoples of both Ger-
manies endorsed the idea, and America would respect the decision if it
went the other way.^15 The change of stance took Bush by surprise and
he could imagine that Akhromeev and Falin were taking it badly.
When he restated his understanding about what had been agreed, Gor-
bachëv repeated that he would respect the decision if the new Germany
decided to stay outside NATO and adopt the status of a neutral power;
and Bush confirmed his assent. Akhromeev and Falin began to mutter
noisily. Shevardnadze tugged Gorbachëv by the sleeve and gesticulated
frantically. Sensing suddenly that he had overstepped the mark, he
recanted his earlier statement. The Soviet team fell apart before Ameri-
can eyes: there had never been a summit like it.^16
Gorbachëv tried to unshoulder the negotiating duties to Shevard-
nadze and Baker. Usually Shevardnadze was cooperative, but not
this time. Shevardnadze retorted that it was for the two Presidents to