444 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
clarify policy. He relented only when he saw how distraught Gor-
bachëv had become. Shevardnadze and Baker agreed a verbal formula
that answered the German question in ambiguous terms.^17 Nothing
definite had been decided. Bush felt again that Gorbachëv was willing
to be more flexible than in previous months, but as yet nothing was
agreed on paper, and there were signs that Gorbachëv might face
dangerous criticism in Moscow if he yielded ground.
On 7 June the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw
Pact met in Moscow’s Oktyabrskaya Hotel for Gorbachëv to explain
Soviet policy. Czechoslovakia’s Václav Havel exclaimed: ‘This is
the first time that I speak here, a place which always resounded to the
dithyrambs of praise to the leaders of the Soviet Union and its politics.’
Gorbachëv, defending the rationale of a renewed Pact, declared: ‘We
have said goodbye to the model that led our countries and people into
a dead end and, on the basis of a sovereign choice made by each
country, we have entered a new path of development.’^18 He welcomed
the Eastern European revolutions: ‘They are, for the most part, pro-
ceeding in a democratic and civilized manner, and we are not of the
opinion that these changes are detrimental to fundamental Soviet
interests.’^19 His big worry was about the German question. He pro-
posed that Germany should stay outside the existing military blocs
- at the most it should become an associate member of both the
Warsaw Pact and NATO.^20 (Bush was confidentially calling this a
‘screwy idea’.)^21 Gorbachëv accepted that US forces were a stabilizing
factor in Western Europe. He wanted to conserve the Warsaw Pact,
primarily as a political organization that would contribute to the
maintenance of security throughout Europe.^22 The final declaration
placed an emphasis on fostering agreement among ‘sovereign states
with equal rights’.^23
Later that month Kohl secured the assent of both German parlia-
ments, in Bonn and East Berlin, recognizing the post-war border with
Poland.^24 It had taken him months of persuasion to achieve this. He
relieved the worries of East Europeans who thought that the new
Germany could have expansionist pretensions. But he inadvertently
weakened their need for Gorbachëv’s support – and the rationale for
the survival of the Warsaw Pact was put into question.
Gorbachëv in his earlier foreign policy had advanced in a straight
line with only occasional zig-zags. Now he faced accusations of
running around in ever-decreasing circles. In mid-June, Central
Committee Secretary Baklanov could stand it no longer and spoke