THE NEW GERMANY 445to the press about his concerns about the concessions being made in
the arms talks.^25 Cracks were appearing in the leadership. Falin in the
Party International Department had implored Gorbachëv in vain to be
firm with Kohl, and now he felt disinclined to hold his tongue. On
19 July he told Ambassador Braithwaite that German politicians after
Kohl’s period in office could demand back the territory lost to Poland
in 1945. Falin was in a frantic mood. He speculated that the Germans
might seek to compensate the Poles at the expense of Belorussia and
Ukraine, which by then might be independent states, by returning to
Poland the eastern territories it had lost at the end of the war.^26 This
showed that Falin had lost his grip on reality, but also that the new
politics in the USSR enabled him and the other critics of Gorbachëv to
air their opinions. It was urgent for the Soviet leadership to reach a
firm and safe settlement about the new Germany and focus on its own
political, economic and national problems.
NATO started a two-day summit in London on 5 July. America
aimed to keep forces on the continent for as long as its allies wanted,
but the active contingent was to be scaled down. Bush obtained assent
to his proposals for the alliance to introduce ‘a significantly reduced
reliance on nuclear weapons, particularly those of the shortest range’.
This was a much less ambitious objective of disarmament than Reagan
had aimed at. But the final communiqué emphasized that NATO no
longer needed to contemplate the use of its nuclear arsenal ‘except as
weapons of last resort’.^27
Gorbachëv’s appeal for financial credits was high on the agenda
even before 10 July 1990, when the G7 summit started in Houston,
Texas. Kohl and Bush kept in contact through the summer months.
Gorbachëv was indicating an urgent need for assistance; he hoped for
a multinational economic package that would enable him to buy
much-needed consumer goods for Soviet consumers – and he asked
Kohl for a direct loan of DM5 billion, implying that he would give
something in return.^28 Kohl inferred that the Soviet leader was hinting
at the possibility of concessions by the USSR if Deutschmarks were
made available to the its stricken budget. He did not want to miss a
momentous opportunity. On the eve of the summit he had a final pre-
paratory talk with the American President at Houston’s Manor Lodge
and campaigned for an agreement to go to Gorbachëv’s aid. Bush
refused to budge. His opinion was that the USSR had yet to conduct
the necessary economic reform and cease propping up Fidel Castro.
But he could see why Kohl wanted to take a different stance and was