446 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
determined to offer finance. He confirmed that he would not stand in
his way. On Kohl’s separate plans for a deal with Moscow, he said
simply, ‘That is a matter for the Chancellor of Germany.’^29
Bush made no attempt to use the Jackson–Vanik amendment as an
excuse, and some of his fellow leaders disliked his bluntness.^30
Thatcher, though, agreed with him. Opposing the provision of credits,
she voiced a preference to limit assistance to advice and expertise.
Mitterrand wanted some kind of action to help Gorbachëv without
saying what he had in mind. The drift of the discussion alarmed Kohl,
who warned that the world faced an immense challenge and said that
the USSR deserved urgent assistance in opening up its economy. He
accused the summit of treating Gorbachëv’s message to the summit as
if it came from the Congo. Kohl drew attention to Gorbachëv’s
achievements in removing abuses of human rights, whereas China had
an awful record of oppression and yet was in receipt of Western assist-
ance. Asked for an explanation of this discrepancy, Bush replied:
‘China and the USSR aren’t one and the same thing.’ Although Mul-
roney added he wanted to assist, he omitted to say how; and Japan’s
Toshiki Kaifu shared in the opposition to credits.^31
This left the Soviet leadership in a lamentable condition, and
Gorbachëv was not alone in foreseeing calamity. Ryzhkov, who had
primary responsibility for the economy, warned that bankruptcy was
certain in the next six months unless external assistance was forth-
coming.^32 Though he was no advocate of a comprehensive transition to
market economics, he supported any move that might attract foreign
credits. While the Council of Ministers despaired about the economy,
the General Staff became despondent about international security. The
East European revolutions deprived the Soviet Union of genuine allies.
Only fears about the new Germany and political instability in Moscow
stopped a mass exodus from the Warsaw Pact. When NATO Secretary
General Wörner arrived in Moscow in the summer, Moiseev made no
effort at hiding his judgement that the Pact was no longer of military
value.^33
Gorbachëv knew that he would take most of the blame for the
growing military and economic trouble. He decided to take drastic
action. Evidently he had some inkling about the unique standpoint that
Kohl was taking and confirmed the invitation to visit Moscow and the
Stavropol region for talks starting on 14 July. Kohl’s entourage under-
stood that something big was in the offing.^34 Excitement mounted on
the West German side – and Finance Minister Waigel confirmed the