448 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
assured Gorbachëv that Poland need have no concern about its
western frontier. The Chancellor hoped to sign a treaty with the Polish
government very soon; he also promised that NATO forces would
never operate on the territory of the soon-to-be-abolished German
Democratic Republic. The West Germans strove to reinforce the grow-
ing confidence by offering to help with the cost of moving Soviet
forces back to the USSR. Waigel undertook to allocate DM2 billion for
this process in addition to the DM5 billion already promised.^41 Bonn
would refrain from heavy pressure. Kohl agreed that the Soviet Army
would not need to complete its withdrawal from East Germany for
another three or four years. Germany would forgo the right to produce
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and reduce the size of its
armed forces to 370,000 troops.^42 Kohl’s financial grant was a crucial
ingredient in the concordat: Gorbachëv knew of Ryzhkov’s predictions
of budgetary collapse if external assistance proved unobtainable.^43
The Houston proceedings had disappointed the Soviet leadership.
Gorbachëv needed to do something drastic, and the deal he struck in
southern Russia was the best option that he thought available.
Raisa had the feeling that her husband might not be obtaining the
formal guarantees that he and the USSR needed. Taking Genscher
aside and speaking in a sombre voice, she made him swear that every-
one would stick to the commitments made in Arkhyz. Genscher held
her hand and replied that both sides had ‘learned the lessons of his-
tory’; he assured her that all would be well.^44
Gorbachëv had consulted only Shevardnadze. They were the same
two individuals who in 1979 had resented their exclusion from the
Politburo decision to invade Afghanistan.^45 The Politburo had never
set up a German Commission like its Afghan one. (There was even a
Committee for South Yemen.)^46 Gorbachëv was never to offer an
explanation for his volte-face. What Shevardnadze told his aides at the
time was probably the nearest thing to the truth. He and Gorbachëv
had already been considering their change of policy before Kohl’s visit.
The assurances they received from Wörner provided some basis for
their confidence. Shevardnadze spoke about the vulnerability of Soviet
forces on German soil. A single incident could set off an armed con-
frontation. Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze anyhow wanted to stick to
the path of conciliation with the American administration; they could
not afford to fall out with Bush. Shevardnadze was candid about the
importance of the financial bail-out that Kohl had offered. But in a
comment that showed the drastic depletion of Soviet authority, he also