450 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
guarantee in the treaty on German reunification. Even his supporters
were to regret this omission in the 1990s when several ex-member
states of the Warsaw Pact joined NATO.^56
In the weeks after Arkhyz, Gorbachëv remained convinced that
he had pulled off an historic deal. He had second thoughts only about
the details. His concern was less about the Germans than about the
Americans. He decided that if the Soviet Army was departing German
soil, American armed forces should do the same. Shevardnadze flew
to West Berlin for a meeting with Baker on 22 July. He referred
the Secretary of State to the political difficulties facing Gorbachëv in
Moscow. Shevardnadze pleaded with Baker to display some reciproca-
tion. Baker was aware of the strains in perestroika. He was on good
terms with Shevardnadze and enjoyed their work together. But politics
was a harsh mistress. Baker contended that the American forces were
in Germany by German consent: it was up to the Germans rather than
foreigners to lay down what happened in their country.^57 Once
Gorbachëv had made his deal with Kohl, he had to endure the con -
sequences. The Bush administration had no intention of yielding
on matters of importance to them. If the question of an American
military presence had been a sticking point for Gorbachëv, he should
have raised it in Arkhyz before shaking hands with the West German
Chancellor.
Gorbachëv continued to liaise with Kohl by phone about the
return of Soviet troops to the USSR. Kohl offered to pay more for their
rehousing if a practical scheme could be agreed.^58 Gorbachëv’s wider
ambition was to persuade the Germans to involve themselves in
rescuing the Soviet economy. Kohl responded encouragingly. On 10
September he suggested that he might be able to assemble interest-free
credits over the next five years; he promised that Finance Minister
Waigel would confirm the arrangements with Deputy Prime Minister
Sitaryan.^59 By November Gorbachëv was asking President Richard von
Weizsäcker for DM20 billion in credits.^60 Waigel informed him that he
had already sanctioned DM24 billion in help for the USSR.^61
There was commotion at the Congress of People’s Deputies in
Moscow when on 24 September the news broke that the German
Democratic Republic was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to explain why there had been no
prior warning. Kovalëv consulted with Falin, one of the critics of Gor-
bachëv’s policy, before standing in for the absent Shevardnadze. The
ministry had known in advance about the East German decision and