456 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
such a way as to avoid disrupting the rest of the USSR’s economy, and
he offered the consoling thought that the ‘national surge’ had achieved
no impact on workers and peasants of the region. He banned Yakovlev
from returning there.^16 This was more to protect himself from trouble
with Ligachëv than to demote Yakovlev. What he now needed was a
practical scheme for action. A group of Politburo members – includ-
ing his allies Yakovlev, Medvedev and Lukyanov – drew up a draft.
They argued for political methods and the avoidance of force. Only
if persuasion failed to work, should the Politburo consider applying
economic sanctions or raising the question of the Lithuanian frontiers
(which had been drawn in Lithuania’s favour when it became a Soviet
republic at the end of the Second World War).^17
The American administration called on the Kremlin and the Lith-
uanian government to settle their differences peacefully. America’s
willingness to negotiate with Gorbachëv was going to depend on the
way he treated the Baltic peoples. Ambassador Matlock suggested the
desirability of referendums on national independence – America
would offer its services in facilitating the process. This was too much
for Yakovlev, who knew that any referendum would produce a vote for
independence. Yakovlev denied that Lithuania had been annexed in
1940 and 1944. He added that when Soviet Russia had recognized
Lithuania’s independence in 1920, the circumstances had been ‘com-
pletely abnormal’. He pleaded with Matlock to recognize how difficult
it was for Gorbachëv to have a dialogue with Landsbergis; he asked for
this message to be relayed to the White House. He remarked that
Soviet leaders had worked at lessening tensions with America despite
their objections to American actions in Panama and the Philippines.
They wanted the Americans to show the same restraint about Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania. Matlock repeated that if force were used on the
Lithuanians, the Americans would refuse to ‘continue the develop-
ment of relations with the USSR’.^18
Shevardnadze tried to assure Secretary Baker that the situation
was becoming less troublesome in Lithuania; he was grateful for
America’s avoidance of anything that might inflame the situation.^19
The topic also arose when he met Bush, who reminded him about the
criticism he was receiving from the Baltic diasporas. Bush repeated his
request for the Soviet leadership to resolve the crisis without resort to
armed repression.^20
The April 1989 Tbilisi bloodshed proved that the Soviet order
retained its capacity for ruthless brutality. As the commission of