460 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
and Kazimira Prunskienė as Prime Minister. They quickly drew up
legislation to declare national independence. The Sąjūdis leadership
were throwing a stone into the river of Soviet politics – and disturbing
the wider waters of Moscow’s relations with Washington.
At the Politburo on 22 March Gorbachëv rejected Varennikov’s call
for a declaration of presidential rule. Gorbachëv rejected the idea but
was open to using economic sanctions to squeeze Landsbergis and the
nationalists. Something drastic had to be done after the Lithuanian
government had cut off fuel deliveries to Soviet military units in Lithu-
ania. Gorbachëv had a preference for dialogue but refused to discount
the possibility of introducing martial law.^41 This failed to satisfy several
Politburo members. Ligachëv argued for swift action. Ryzhkov sug-
gested imposing a new parallel government, chosen by Moscow, just as
Stalin had done when setting up a Finnish administration during the
Winter War with Finland in 1939–1940.^42 Although Gorbachëv hoped
to avoid extreme measures of this sort, he was less than clear about
what might work instead. Yakovlev tried to help out by proposing to
make overtures to Western governments; his idea was to inform them
of latest events and to ‘neutralize their provocational position’. Beyond
that point, neither Gorbachëv nor Yakovlev had the slightest notion
about how to cope with the political crisis by the Baltic.^43
When on 6 April Bush received Shevardnadze at the White House,
Shevardnadze asked the President to refrain from doing anything to
encourage disturbance in the Baltic republics.^44 Bush warned against
using force against Lithuania. Despite professing support for pere-
stroika, he indicated that American leaders were watching Moscow
warily.^45 Shevardnadze affected an air of confidence about Lithuania
throughout his Washington visit. Baker confessed to being surprised
at his composure.^46 Shevardnadze was only sticking to the instructions
that Moscow had given him. His personal opinion was that Gorbachëv
was listening too much to Varennikov and risking a breakdown in the
arms talks with the Americans. Shevardnadze feared that this could
restart an arms race which the USSR simply could not afford.^47 He told
his ministry entourage about how nervous he felt at the growing
hostility amidst the Soviet leadership to the official line of policy as the
state began to break apart. Although Gorbachëv manoeuvred by offer-
ing tactical concessions to his critics, the reformers were nowhere near
as secure as once they had been.^48
Gorbachëv decided to teach the Lithuanians a lesson. On 19 April
he announced a blockade of trade and fuel supplies from the rest of