466 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
phone. Shevardnadze accepted the call. It became obvious that he
retained a sense of duty for the ministry, which Kovalëv was running
in his absence. When Shevardnadze demanded time for reflection,
Kovalëv assured him of Gorbachëv’s support; he added that if
Shevardnadze stuck to his decision, he would jeopardize everything
that he had achieved. Shevardnadze undertook to think things over
again.^21
Shevardnadze spoke to Gorbachëv that evening. Next day he was
back at his desk in the ministry and rang Kovalëv: ‘Come round to my
office; I’m here.’^22 He left his letter of resignation locked in his safe.
A few days later he told Stepanov-Mamaladze: ‘The [Party Central
Committee] plenum confirmed my very worst concerns. With only
the rarest exceptions, everybody demanded severe measures. All this
is directly linked to the demonstration of force on 24 December. It’s
a more cunning and dangerous blow aimed at perestroika than [the
Tbilisi massacre of ] 9 April.’^23 Gorbachëv reassured him somewhat
by asking him to go to Lithuania and hold talks with those who
were demanding independence.^24 Shevardnadze confided to Stepanov-
Mamaladze: ‘You know, I can walk out this very day. But I badly want
- purely in a human way – to bring what has been started to comple-
tion . . . To bring it to a logical conclusion. This would make life
worthwhile.’^25
Opponents of Soviet foreign policy meanwhile continued to single
out Shevardnadze for blame – it was dangerous for them to criticize
Gorbachëv but everyone knew that they were really aiming their fire at
both of them. Shevardnadze, furthermore, had undoubtedly pushed
the reform of foreign policy with zest; and there had been no let-up in
recent weeks. The critics were angry with him. Shevardnadze had
yielded to Baker’s terms for an ‘open skies’ agreement in September
1989 without any preliminary analysis of the military problems; he
had consented to their proposals to reduce stockpiles of chemical
weapons, ignoring the lack of decommissioning facilities in the USSR.
On 23 October 1989, in breach of official policy, he told the Supreme
Soviet that the Krasnoyarsk radar station was an infringement of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.^26 He implied that the whole Politburo had
been deceived.^27 Kornienko later claimed to have briefed Shevard-
nadze fully about the history of the station in September 1985 before
the minister flew to America.^28 The charge was also laid that Shevard-
nadze had failed to push for the agreed numbers in arms reduction the
Ottawa talks in February 1990.^29