The End of the Cold War. 1985-1991

(Sean Pound) #1

476 THE END OF THE COLD WAR


dropped other prominent reformers from his entourage. Vadim Med-
vedev resigned from the Presidential Council with Gorbachëv’s
consent. Alexander Yakovlev removed himself from public view. In
the Supreme Soviet, the enemies of reform were cock-a-hoop. Colonel
Nikolai Petrushenko and the Soyuz group boasted that they would
continue to achieve the removal of yet more reformers.^18
On 11 December 1990 Bush announced a financial facility for the
USSR to buy $1  billion worth of American wheat.^19 Shevardnadze vis-
ited him next day at the White House. Bush tried to dispel the Soviet
reluctance to offer full support for military action in the Persian Gulf.
He hoped that his offer of credits would show his Soviet friends that he
appreciated that a hard winter lay ahead for them.^20 He also mentioned
Lithuania and mentioned yet again that President Landsbergis had
likened him to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain before the Second
World War – this was his way of reminding Shevardnadze that America
was refraining from demanding immediate independence for the Lith-
uanians. Shevardnadze thanked Bush for the promise of economic
assistance. Bush called for ‘our beautiful coalition’ to hold together.^21
Unfortunately for Shevardnadze, Gorbachëv continued to yield
ground to the critics of perestroika on internal policy, and Shevard-
nadze worried that the retreat might soon become a Gadarene rush
that would trample all the gains of recent years. The rift between them
in international relations was smaller because Shevardnadze knew that
Gorbachëv wanted to remain on good terms with America; but they
disagreed about how to achieve this. Shevardnadze recognized that
Bush had resolved upon ejecting Saddam from Kuwait by force. He
could see no point in obstructing the Americans in any serious fash-
ion, especially if the Soviet leadership hoped to enlist their help with
difficulties in the USSR, whereas Gorbachëv continued to aspire to a
more independent line in international relations, giving priority to
the solution of conflicts by peaceful methods. In mid-December the
Soviet leadership informed the Americans that it could no longer
agree to provide transport to the Persian Gulf for British helicopters.^22
At some point in the winter of 1990–1991 Gorbachëv received a
menacing letter from a score of leaders of the armed forces. Akhro-
meev was to recall that they objected to a string of decisions that
they felt had undermined the country’s capacity to defend itself.^23
On 19 December 1990 Falin had criticized the German treaty at the
Supreme Soviet’s International Relations Committee.
Next day, Shevardnadze caused a political earthquake. The occa-

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